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The Case for LGBT Equality
REVIVING THE POLITICAL PROCESS DOCTRINE
AND REPURPOSING THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE
Terri R. Day† & Danielle Weatherby††
INTRODUCTION
In February 2015, ultraconservative Arkansas Senator
Bart Hester introduced Arkansas Senate Bill 202, the “Intrastate
Commerce Improvement Act,” and it quickly passed through both
houses of the Arkansas legislature.1 Dubbed “Hester’s Law,” S.B.
202 prohibits municipalities from carving out civil rights
protections for populations that are not already protected by
Arkansas state law.2 As such, it ostensibly restricts cities like the
progressive university community of Fayetteville from passing civil
rights ordinances that extend antidiscrimination protections to the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community.3
† Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law;
LL.M., Yale University (1995); J.D., University of Florida (1991); M.S.S.A., Case Western
Reserve University (1976); B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison (1974). Many thanks
to Mary “Kati” Haupt and Allison Evans, whose work on equal protection as applied to
LGBT individuals and the political process doctrine, respectively, helped inform sections
in this article. Beyond their research, Kati’s and Allison’s help in thinking about the
issues in this article have been invaluable. I also want to express gratitude to Barry
University School of Law and Dean Diaz for supporting the writing of this article.
†† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law; J.D.,
University of Florida Levin College of Law (2005); B.A., Franklin and Marshall College
(2002). My deepest appreciation goes out to Wynne Tan, my research assistant and
dear friend, who worked tirelessly to put the finishing touches on this article.
1 S.B. 202, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); see also Jeff Guo, That
Anti-Gay Bill in Arkansas Actually Became Law Today. Why Couldn’t Activists Stop
It?, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/201
5/02/23/that-anti-gay-bill-in-arkansas-actually-became-law-today-why-couldnt-activists
-stop-it/ [http://perma.cc/9XUB-MS73]; Julia Craven, Arkansas House Votes in Favor
of LGBT Discrimination, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2015, 5:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/13/arkansas-lgbt-discrimination_n_6680802.html
[http://perma.cc/6M2X-S7AB].
2 Ark. S.B. 202; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1-401 to -403 (West 2015).
3 Todd Gill, Proposed Bill Would Prohibit Future Civil Rights Ordinances,
FAYETTEVILLE FLYER (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.fayettevilleflyer.com/2015/02/03/proposed-
bill-would-prohibit-future-civil-rights-ordinances/ [http://perma.cc/E7DA-694N]; Jeff Guo,
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Hester’s Law came as a reaction to a civil rights battle
that played out the year before in Fayetteville.4 Less than six
months after the Fayetteville City Council passed Chapter 119,
a local ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity, the voters repealed it in
a December 2014 special election.5 Hester’s Law codified what
seemed to be the ultimate will of the Fayetteville people—that
antidiscrimination protections remain limited, protecting only
those groups already covered by the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.
In an effort to circumvent the constraints of Hester’s Law,
Fayetteville attempted to pass another ordinance, known as the
Uniform Civil Rights Protection,6 this time referencing existing
state protections for sexual orientation and gender identity in the
Arkansas Anti-Bullying Act.7 After the City of Fayetteville waged
a second war in the epic battle over civil rights, the positive
results of its efforts were challenged under Hester’s Law.8
What Everybody Missed During the Fight over Religious Freedom Laws This Year, WASH.
POST (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/04/06/what-
everybody-missed-during-the-fight-over-religious-freedom-laws-this-year/ [http://perma.cc/
KR8C-FVUC].
4 Gill, supra note 3; John Lyon, New Law Seeks to Bar Anti-Discrimination
Ordinances, but Interpretations Vary, ARK. NEWS (July 22, 2015, 5:19 PM),
http://arkansasnews.com/news/arkansas/new-law-seeks-bar-anti-discrimination-ordinances-
interpretations-vary [http://perma.cc/9NT8-RKGY].
5 Lyon, supra note 4.
6 Fayetteville, Ark., Ordinance No. 5781 (June 16, 2015); Todd Gill, New
Civil Rights Ordinance Announced in Fayetteville, FAYETTEVILLE FLYER (June 5, 2015),
http://www.fayettevilleflyer.com/2015/06/05/new-civil-rights-ordinance-announced-in-
fayetteville/ [http://perma.cc/4G72-WR28].
7 Gill, supra note 6.
8 Id.; see also Brenda Blagg, Between the Lines: Cities Defy Lawmakers’ Intent:
Future of Local Laws May Still Rest in Legislators’ Hands, NORTHWEST ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE (July 29, 2015). On September 8, 2015, the people of Fayetteville voted the
Uniform Civil Rights Protection Ordinance 5781 into city code. Bil Browning,
Fayetteville, Arkansas Voters Returned to Ballot Box over LGBT Civil Rights, ADVOC.
(Sept. 8, 2015, 9:10 PM), http://www.advocate.com/arkansas/2015/09/08/fayetteville-voted-
lgbt-rights-again [http://perma.cc/P344-F5GV]. Days before the election, Protect
Fayetteville, an organized group of opponents of Ordinance 5781, filed a lawsuit seeking an
injunction of the election and arguing that 5781 violated Hester’s Law and was therefore
unenforceable. Protect Fayetteville Files Lawsuit Challenging Validity of Civil Rights
Ordinance, 5NEWS (Aug. 31, 2015, 9:47 PM), http://5newsonline.com/2015/08/31/protect-
fayetteville-files-lawsuit-challenging-validity-of-civil-rights-ordinance/ [http://perma.cc/56K
G-L2HD]. Circuit Court Judge Doug Martin denied the group’s request for an injunction
immediately. Id.Months later, after the ordinance went into effect and the parties had time
to adequately brief the court, Judge Martin dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that
Ordinance 5781 did not violate the plain language of Hester’s Law. Zuzanna Sitek, Circuit
Court Judge Upholds Fayetteville Civil Rights Ordinance, 5NEWS (Mar. 1, 2016, 6:01 PM),
http://5newsonline.com/2016/03/01/circuit-court-judge-upholds-fayetteville-civil-rights-ordin
ance/ [http://perma.cc/9HHK-CQCT]. His reasoning echoes the arguments advanced by the
City of Fayetteville. He found that Hester’s Law does not preclude the protection of LGBT
individuals because it simply prohibits municipalities from creating protected classes not
covered in state law, and there are already antibullying protections in state law for LGBT
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Legislation resembling Hester’s Law has been passed in
Tennessee and is currently pending legislative approval in Texas
and West Virginia.9 In Montana, Michigan, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma, bills like Tennessee’s and West Virginia’s have been
considered but were postponed in committee.10 These laws would
add to the growing patchwork of robust free exercise laws and
represent the fruits of the right-wing, religiously conservative
effort to preempt the realm of LGBT civil rights.11 Taking direct
aim at the judiciary’s efforts to uphold the constitutional rights of
minorities like gays and lesbians, in the aggregate, these laws
lead to a system of condoned discrimination under the guise of
religious freedom and the political process.12
As state legislatures in the South and Midwest pass
reactive laws that pit religion against civil rights, the residents of
these states are on the defensive against LGBT rights, exercising
their veto power at the ballot box through the political process.13
As the narrative of Fayetteville’s city ordinance indicates, the
majority can override a minority of elected decision makers. The
question is—should they?
students. Id. Although Judge Martin did not rule on the constitutionality of Hester’s Law,
an appeal by the Protect Fayetteville group is now pending in the state’s highest court.
9 See TENN. CODEANN. §§ 7-51-1801 to -1802 (West 2015); TENN. CODEANN. § 4-
21-102 (West 2012) (adding in a new definition of “Sex” to include only “the designation of
an individual person as male or female as indicated on the individual’s birth certificate”); see
also H.B. 1556, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/84R/billtext/pdf/HB01556I.pdf#navpanes=0 [http://perma.cc/66D5-N6VB]; S.B. 1155,
2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015), http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/billtext/pdf/
SB01155I.pdf#navpanes=0 [http://perma.cc/2YU6-W8HK]; H.B. 2881, 2015 Leg., 82d Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 2015), http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2015_SESSIONS/RS/
pdf_bills/HB2881%20INTR%20PRINTED.pdf [http://perma.cc/W2A5-NN9C].
10 H.B. 516, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011) (died in committee); H.B. 5039, 96th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (died in committee); Leg. B. 912, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012)
(indefinitely postponed); H.B. 2245, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012) (died in committee).
11 Danielle Weatherby, The Arkansas “Mini-RFRA” is Bad Policy, 2015 ARK.
L. NOTES 1669 (2015).
12 Id.
13 Sean Delaney, Sterling Heights: Council Votes to Repeal Controversial Non-
Discrimination Ordinance, ADVISOR & SOURCE NEWSPAPERS (Sept. 17, 2014),
http://www.sourcenewspapers.com/articles/2014/09/17/news/doc5419bacc89f78749199554.txt
[http://perma.cc/WAR6-RWAF]; Todd Gill, Voters Repeal Civil Rights Ordinance in
Fayetteville, FAYETTEVILLE FLYER (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.fayettevilleflyer.com/2014/12
/09/voters-repeal-civil-rights-ordinance-in-fayetteville/ [http://perma.cc/UPT4-LHUD]; Devin
Kelly, Anchorage Voters Favor Unions in Repealing Mayor Sullivan’s Labor Law Rewrite,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.adn.com/article/20141104/anchorage-
voters-favor-unions-repealing-mayor-sullivans-labor-law-rewrite [http://perma.cc/JN6B-
FDSJ]; Sarah Parvini, Springfield, Mo., Voters Repeal LGBT Anti-Discrimination Law, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:12 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-missouri-anti
discrimination-law-20150408-story.html [http://perma.cc/CW9J-EJE4]; Amanda Terkel,
Chattanooga Voters Reject Law Extending LGBT Protections, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 8, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/08/chattanooga-lgbt_n_
5662602.html [http://perma.cc/XZF2-KZD2].
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Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has definitively
recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry, legislators and
citizens are actively utilizing the political process, through voter
initiatives, to limit or extend the momentum ignited by the
Obergefell v. Hodges decision.14 Even before the Court announced
its decision, voters and legislators on both sides of the debate were
considering ways to further their political agendas surrounding
the LGBT civil rights movement.15
Those efforts have taken several forms. The most notable
are local nondiscrimination ordinances (NDOs), robust state
religious freedom laws, and statewide initiatives to invalidate or
block local expansion of antidiscrimination protections, particularly
in the area of public accommodations.16 Since 1974, there have
14 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
15 See Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, States Weigh Legislation to Let Businesses
Refuse to Serve Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/06/us/anticipating-nationwide-right-to-same-sex-marriage-states-weigh-religious-
exemption-bills.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/GPW7-6N2A] (explaining how bills that would
allow businesses to discriminate against LGBT customers were considered in Arizona,
Arkansas, Georgia, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wyoming); Tim Farley, Marriage License Bill Targets Same-Sex Couples, Federal
Government Intrusion, RED DIRT REP. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.reddirtreport.com/red-
dirt-news/marriage-license-bill-targets-same-sex-couples-federal-government-intrusion
[http://perma.cc/LK2E-4MDP] (proposed Oklahoma bill would prohibit state-recognized
marriages so that city clerks would not have to recognize same-sex marriages); Molly
Hennessey-Fiske, Texas Legislative Panel Votes to Restrict Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-texas-same-sex-
marriage-20150422-story.html [http://perma.cc/N6S3-DRQR]; James Nord, Gay Marriage
Supporters Unveil Proposed Legislation, MINNPOST (Feb. 27, 2013), https://
www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2013/02/gay-marriage-supporters-unveil-proposed-
legislation [http://perma.cc/F8B6-LFVN].
16 See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-1-148 (2011) (prohibiting
discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity, among other
categories); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-550 (2013) (same); UTAH CODE
§ 34A-5-106 (West 2015) (prohibiting discrimination in housing and employment on the
bases of sexual orientation and gender identity). But see H.B. 1228, 90th Gen. Assemb. Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2015) (broad religious freedom bill that would have allowed individuals and
businesses to refuse services to LGBT patrons); ALA. CONST. amend. 622 (ratified 1999);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2007) (mini religious freedom law); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-571b (2001) (same); FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-761.05 (2015); S.B. 129, 153rd Gen.
Assemb. (Ga. 2015) (same); IDAHOCODE §§ 73-401 to -404 (2000); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 775-35
(1998) (same); S.B. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (Ind. 2015) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-5301 to -5305 (West 2013) (same); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:5231-5242 (2010) (same); S.B.
4 (Mich. 2015) (same); S.B. 2681, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014) (same); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.302-
1.307 (2003) (same); N.M. STAT. §§ 28-22-1 to 5 (2015) (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 272 §§ 51-251
to -258 (2000) (same): PA. CONS. STAT. § 214 (2002) (same); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1 to
-3 (West 2014) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2014) (same); S.B. 2294, 108th
Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2014) (same); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5. §§ 110.001 to .012 (West
1999) (same); VA. CODE § 57-2.02 (2009) (same); H.B. 0083 (Wyo. 2015); see also Mike
McPhate, Mississippi Law on Serving Gays Proves Divisive, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/us/mississippi-gay-lgbt-discrimination-religion.html?em
c=edit_tnt_20160414&nlid=48778543&tntemail0=y&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/GP89-5YL3];
Jonathan M. Katz & Eric Eckholm, Anti-Gay Laws Bring Backlash in Mississippi and
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been at least 40 attempts at ballot initiatives to repeal LGBT-
protective NDOs, half of which were successful.17
This article focuses on the interplay of these local and
state initiatives, particularly on how the political process affects
LGBT-inclusive nondiscrimination ordinances, where success was
or could be feasible at a local level. The battle at the ballot box
playing out in Arkansas is just one example of the tug-of-war
between LGBT-protective successes at the local level and the
state legislative or voter initiatives that reverse or preempt those
local successes.
The Arkansas story of push and pull is not the first time
that statewide voter initiatives have blocked local efforts to
expand LGBT rights. Over two decades ago, Colorado voters
amended their state constitution to prohibit any government
entity from extending nondiscrimination protections to
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation.18 While legislators
in Arkansas, Tennessee, and other states may have drafted
legislation like Hester’s Law more artfully than the Colorado
amendment struck down in Romer v. Evans, the two initiatives
produced the same results. Since Romer, the Supreme Court has
not considered the constitutionality of a law restricting the
expansion of rights for the LGBT population. Just recently,
however, the Court addressed the application of the political
process doctrine in upholding a Michigan initiative that banned
the use of race-sensitive admissions preferences after university
governing boards had previously adopted such policies.19 In
Schuette v. BAMN, the Court upheld voters’ rights to utilize the
political process in deciding the “difficult and delicate” policy issue
of affirmative action in college admissions.20 The narratives of
race-based protections and LGBT protections are closely bound.
Historically, courts have applied a judicially created
doctrine in assessing the constitutional muster of voter initiatives
that aim to change established political decisionmaking processes
in ways that create greater hurdles for a minority group (and that
North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/us/gay-
rights-mississippi-north-carolina.html [http://perma.cc/8U3L-3YPH].
17 LILLIAN FADERMAN ET AL., GREAT EVENTS FROM HISTORY: GAY, LESBIAN,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER EVENTS, 1848-2006 (2007); LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B.
GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 1-16 (2001); JOYCE
MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME
COURT (2001); LEIGH RUTLEDGE, THEGAYDECADES (1992).
18 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
19 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
20 Id. at 1636, 1648.
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group only) to attain beneficial legislation.21 Pursuant to the
political process doctrine,22 government restructuring,23 which
affects a minority group’s equal participation in the political
process, triggers strict judicial review, even if intentional
discrimination was not the motivation for the legislative
restructuring.24 In both Romer and Schuette, the Court declined to
apply the political process doctrine.25
This article considers the political process doctrine and
its application to laws like Arkansas’s Hester’s Law. Despite
the fact that the Court has all but abolished the political
process doctrine, the policy and theory supporting the doctrine
still apply to laws that restructure the legislative process in a
way that “change[s] the rules in the middle of the game” for an
underrepresented minority group.26
Ultimately, the Court is unlikely to invalidate a legislative
or voter initiative that bans local efforts to pass LGBT-inclusive
NDOs pursuant to the political process doctrine.27 Instead, this
article suggests that courts analyzing the constitutionality of
Hester-type laws should adopt a different analytical framework
that links private discrimination in public accommodations to the
Commerce Clause. While the recognition that private
discrimination affects interstate commerce is not novel,28 the
application of this theory—which invokes the Dormant Commerce
Clause—is a creative, albeit imperfect, way to fight the next wave
of discrimination affecting the LGBT community.
21 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390-93 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982);Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651-83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
22 Christopher E. D’Alessio, A Bridge Too Far: The Limits of the Political
Process Doctrine in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 9 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 103, 107 (2013) (defining the political process doctrine
as a “less familiar [form] and more nuanced branch of the equal protection doctrine”).
The traditional equal protection analysis focuses on discriminatory intent; the political
process doctrine, on the other hand, looks at the discriminatory results of government
restructuring. Specifically, it considers a change in political structure that places
special burdens on the ability of the minority to achieve their goals. Id. (quoting
Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Burdens, and the
CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1024 (1996)).
23 Government restructuring is changing the level at which policy is made
and enacted. For instance, Hester-type laws take the power and process to pass LGBT-
protective NDOs away from the level of local government to a statewide level.
24 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651-83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
25 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996); Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1650
(Breyer, J., concurring).
26 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
27 Romer, 517 U.S. at 625; Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1650 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
28 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 247 (1964).
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Part I of this article frames the historical backdrop that
built momentum for the civil rights movement affecting the LGBT
community. Part II describes efforts to limit LGBT rights,
including laws like Hester’s Law and similar legislation in other
southern states that restrict cities and local governments from
creating nondiscrimination protections for LGBT residents and
employees. Part III of this article explains the political process
doctrine, which dictates that laws that restructure the political
process to obstruct the ability of minorities to enact legislation
violate the Equal Protection Clause.29 While the application of the
political process doctrine has been limited to race-based conduct
and conduct restricting voting rights, Part IV considers the equal
protection implications of laws like Hester’s Law that aim to
preempt intrastate civil rights laws.
In conclusion, this article suggests a novel analytical
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of laws like
Arkansas’s Hester’s Law. Pursuant to the Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, laws that restrict municipalities from carving out
antidiscrimination protections for minority groups negatively
affect interstate commerce and therefore, if challenged, should be
found unconstitutional.
I. THE LGBT CIVIL RIGHTSMOVEMENT
A. The Rise of LGBT Advocacy
The modern-day LGBT civil rights movement rose in
tandem with other new liberal social movements, such as Black
Power and the anti-Vietnam War protests of the 1960s.30 As other
minority groups found their voice, so too did groups organizing
around their nontraditional sexual identities or preferences.31
This new radicalism is often attributed to the 1969 Stonewall
riots, during which a group of LGBT patrons at a New York bar
resisted a police raid.32
In the early morning of June 28, 1969, at the Stonewall
Inn, a popular gay bar in Greenwich Village, New York, a police
29 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651-82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
30 John D’Emilio, “After Stonewall,” in QUEER CULTURES 3-35 (Deborah
Carlin & Jennifer DiGrazia eds., 2004).
31 Id.
32 Id.; Vern Bullough, When Did the Gay Rights Movement Begin?, HIST. NEWS
NETWORK (Apr. 17, 2005), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/11316 [http://perma.cc/
V3NV-6NUV].
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raid escalated and resulted in multiple patron arrests.33 Police
quickly lost control of the situation, and an angry crowd amassed
outside, forcing the police to barricade themselves inside the bar.34
Subsequent riots lasted for nearly a week.35
Following the Stonewall riots, LGBT groups such as the
Gay Liberation Front and the Gay Activists Alliance began to
organize,36 and the first Pride Parade occurred in New York in
1970.37 But as quickly as this movement grew, so too did the
majoritarian denouncement of homosexuality.38 In fact, the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual identified homosexuality as a mental illness until 1974,
and gender dysphoria, the formal diagnosis for individuals who
suffer from severe emotional distress due to their discontent
with the sex they were assigned at birth, is still in the Manual.39
Labeling this condition as a mental illness that does not afflict
every gender-nonconforming individual has negative and
stigmatizing connotations.
Today, LGBT individuals in America are undoubtedly a
statistical minority group. The Williams Institute40 estimates that
between 5.2 and 9.5 million (about 2.2%–4.0%) of American
adults identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender.41 While
statistically underrepresented, LGBT individuals suffer
33 American Experience: Introduction: Stonewall Uprising, PBS, http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/introduction/stonewall-intro/ [http://
perma.cc/4PVH-UZAN] (last visited May 10, 2016).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 D’Emilio, supra note 30.
37 American Experience: Timeline: Milestones in the American Gay Rights
Movement, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/stonewall/
[http://perma.cc/WP5H-VPBJ] (last visited May 10, 2016).
38 Andrew Belonsky, The Gay Pride Issue, QUEERTY (June 18, 2007),
http://www.queerty.com/the-gay-pride-issue-20070618 [http://perma.cc/9KQD-2LJP].
39 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) (defining “gender dysphoria,” which communicates
the emotional distress that can result from “a marked incongruence between one’s
experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender”); Danielle Weatherby, From Jack
to Jill: Gender Expression as Protected Speech in the Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 89 (2015); Alice Dreger, Why Gender Dysphoria Should No
Longer Be Considered a Medical Disorder, PAC. STANDARD (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.psmag.com/health-and-behavior/take-gender-identity-disorder-dsm-68308
[http://perma.cc/E8FC-DPPY].
40 The Williams Institute is a national think tank at UCLA Law School that
conducts “independent research on sexual orientation and gender identity law and
public policy.” Mission, WILLIAMS INST., http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/mission/
[http://perma.cc/AAY4-TJMU] (last visited May 10, 2016).
41 Gary J. Gates, LGBT Demographics: Comparisons Among Population-Based
Surveys, WILLIAMS INST. (Sept. 2014), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-
lgbt-demographics-studies/lgbt-demogs-sep-2014/#sthash.mH3OgkAQ.dpuf [http://perma.cc/
TA6G-8KA6].
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discrimination in the workplace, in housing transactions, and in
places of public accommodation at a rate far exceeding that of
their gender-conforming and heterosexual peers.42 For this reason,
there is a great need for LGBT-protective antidiscrimination laws
and laws granting equal rights to same-sex couples.43 The U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent marriage equality decision is a step in the
right direction, but LGBT advocates, and this article, submit that
it did not go far enough.44
B. The Long Road to Marriage Equality
Although the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges held
that bans on same-sex marriage violate the fundamental right to
marry recognized under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,45 the broader issues surrounding LGBT
discrimination are far from settled.46 Shortly after the Supreme
Court announced its decision, state legislatures, politicians, and
local governmental entities began proposing legislation to limit or
block the application of the Obergefell ruling.47 Even before the
Court announced its decision, Republican presidential candidates
boldly announced that they would fight a ruling favoring same-
42 M.V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE:
EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION (2007)
(reporting that 15%–43% of gay and transgender workers have experienced some form
of discrimination on the job and that 7%–41% of gay and transgender workers have
been verbally or physically assaulted or had their workplace vandalized); see also
Weatherby, supra note 39.
43 SeeWeatherby, supra note 39.
44 Samantha Allen, LGBT Leaders: Gay Marriage Is Not Enough, DAILY BEAST
(June 26, 2015, 10:35 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/26/same-sex-
marriage-is-legal-now-what.html [http://perma.cc/35PF-2MK2]; Editorial Board, The
Challenges That Remains After Marriage Equality, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015, 2:30 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/opinion/the-challenges-that-remain-after-marriage-
equality.html?ref=topics [http://perma.cc/DMR9-W25U]; Eric Schnurer, Equality for All,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 29, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/
blogs/eric-schnurer/2015/06/29/gay-marriage-decision-should-have-been-all-about-constit
utional-equality [http://perma.cc/JE62-NCGJ].
45 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
46 Allen, supra note 44; Editorial Board, supra note 44; Schnurer, supra note 44.
47 See, e.g., Texas Attorney General Says Judges Can Deny Same-Sex Marriage
Licenses, U.S.A. TODAY NETWORK KVUE-TV, AUSTIN (June 29, 2015, 2:37 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/06/29/paxton-state-workers-can-
deny-marriage-licenses-same-sex-couples/29456745/ [http://perma.cc/WL7S-HFCP]; Kate
Abbey-Lambertz, Michigan Governor Signs Controversial Religious Freedom Adoption
Law, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2015, 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/
06/10/michigan-adoption-bill-lgbt-parents_n_7553952.html [http://perma.cc/D6DY-N24B];
Jackie Beran, State Legislative Responses to Obergefell v. Hodges, BALLOTPEDIA (Jan. 25,
2016), http://ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_responses_to_Obergefell_v._Hodges [http://
perma.cc/K25T-572N] (detailing the legislation drafted and proposed in Arkansas,
Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin, all in reaction to the
Court’s June 26, 2015, marriage equality decision).
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sex marriage.48 And in response to the Obergefell decision, U.S.
Senator and Republican presidential candidate Ted Cruz
proposed a constitutional amendment requiring retention votes
(votes to retain the judge by the electorate) for Supreme Court
Justices.49 Even when a federal court in Alabama ruled in 2015
that same-sex couples had the right to marry, the elected state
high court—led by marriage equality-opponent Chief Justice Roy
Moore—told judges in the state to defy the federal order.50
But because the Supreme Court’s decision granting
marriage equality to same-sex couples is the beginning, not the
end, of the same-sex marriage struggle, it is important to trace
the history of same-sex marriage litigation from its inception in
Baker v. Nelson51 to Obergefell v. Hodges.52 With respect to LGBT
rights, the United States has been significantly behind other
nations, particularly in granting marriage equality to same-sex
couples.53 As early as the mid-1970s, many states began adopting
constitutional bans on same-sex marriages through either ballot
48 Eric Bradner, GOP Hopefuls Weigh In on Gay Marriage, CNN (Jan. 25, 2015,
1:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/25/politics/gop-2016-gay-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/
ZBV7-5KCE].
49 Mollie Reilly, Ted Cruz Wants to Be Able to Vote Out Supreme Court Justices,
HUFFINGTONPOST (June 26, 2015, 7:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/26/ted-
cruz-supreme-court_n_7675528.html [http://perma.cc/MQ7Z-TJT6].
50 Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Gay Marriage in Alabama Begins, but
Only in Parts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/us/alabama-
supreme-court-same-sex-marriages.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/6D2U-PJEC]; see also Ariane
de Vogue, Alabama Chief Justice: Same-sex Marriage Ban Still in Effect, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/06/politics/roy-moore-alabama-supreme-court/ [http://perma.cc/
67J8-F7SE] (Jan. 6, 2016, 4:11 PM) (quoting the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court, Roy Moore, as stating, “Until further decision by the Alabama Supreme
Court, the existing orders of the Alabama Supreme Court that Alabama probate
judges have a ministerial duty not to issue any marriage license contrary to the
Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment or the Alabama Marriage Protection Act
remain in full force and effect”). In May 2016, however, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry
Commission filed six charges with the state’s Court of the Judiciary related to Chief
Justice Moore’s order, and under Alabama law, Chief Justice Moore has been
suspended without pay pending a hearing on the charges. Kent Faulk, What Now for
Suspended Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore?, AL.COM (May 10, 2016, 5:30 AM),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016/05/suspended_alabama_chief_justi
c.html [http://perma.cc/9VP9-EESN].
51 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.) (issuing a one-line summary
decision dismissing the case and stating that prohibiting same-sex couples from
marrying did not present a substantial federal question).
52 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
53 Akbar Shahid Ahmed, Other Countries on the U.S. Finally Getting Marriage
Equality: Been There, Done That, HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2015, 12:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/26/us-gay-marriage-world-reactions_n_7673164.
html [http://perma.cc/U64Q-TQTZ]; Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 26, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/gay-marriage-around-the-world-
2013/ [http://perma.cc/CC4S-CA26] (explaining that nearly two dozen countries, including
Great Britain, Spain, France, Portugal, Denmark, Belgium, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa,
and New Zealand legally recognize same-sex marriage).
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referendums or other legislation.54 These same-sex marriage bans
carried significant popular support.55 By the mid to late 1990s, 33
states and the District of Columbia had implemented measures
limiting the state-recognized institution of marriage to a union
between one man and one woman.56
As same-sex marriage bans became the majority legal
position in the country, LGBT advocates began fighting for
marriage equality.57 Several early decisions helped shape the body
of same-sex marriage jurisprudence. In 1971, the U.S. Supreme
Court summarily dismissed an appeal of the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decision in Baker v. Nelson and upheld a state law that
limited marriage to persons of the opposite sex.58 Since the case
came to the Court through mandatory appellate review (as
opposed to writ of certiorari), the dismissal was “on the merits”
and arguably became binding precedent for other courts
considering the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.59
54 Nancy Kubasek et al., Amending the Defense of Marriage Act: A Necessary
Step Toward Gaining Full Legal Rights for Same-Sex Couples, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 959, 964 n.32 (2011) (listing the 38 states that banned same-sex marriage
either by constitutional amendment (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin) or by statute (Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming)). Many states originally had a
statutory ban, but around 2003, many of the states that already had a statutory ban
passed constitutional amendments.
55 Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public
Policy in Inter-jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations, 2008 BYU L.
REV. 1855, 1911 (2008); Jane S. Schacter, What Marriage Equality Can Tell Us About
Popular Constitutionalism (and Vice-Versa), 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1174 (2015).
56 Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/ [http://perma.cc/
YFV8-EQBS].
57 Id.
58 Baker v. Nelson,191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
59 Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1383 n.25 (2010).
Although a summary dismissal is technically a dismissal on the merits, the
Supreme Court has made clear that such a dismissal does not “have the same
precedential value . . . as does an opinion of th[e] Court after briefing and oral
argument on the merits.” The Court has therefore suggested that although
generally “inferior federal courts had best adhere to the view that if the Court
has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so,” this may not be the
case “when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.” As discussed in detail
in the text, both equal protection and due process doctrines, as related to the
question of same-sex marriage, have evolved considerably since 1972, when
Baker was dismissed. Accordingly, we agree with courts that have held that the
dismissal in Baker does not bar lower federal courts from substantively
considering the federal constitutional claims that case raised.
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Following Baker, the number of legal challenges premised on
marriage equality was limited. Most advocates believed they were
bound by Baker.60
The legal landscape changed dramatically in 2013.61 On
June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v.
Windsor that section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act was
unconstitutional insofar as it limited the definition of marriage to
one man and one woman.62 The decision created federal marital
protections for married same-sex couples.63
Following Windsor, a wave of legal battles challenging
same-sex marriage bans percolated through the nation’s state
and federal courts.64 Between 2013 and the Supreme Court’s
Id. (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 477 n.20 (1979) (citation omitted)); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344
(1975); Andrew Janet, Eat, Drink, and Marry: Why Baker v. Nelson Should Have No
Impact on Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1777 (2014); Mark
Strasser, When a Baker Summary Dismissal Becomes Stale: On Same-Sex Marriage
Bans and Federal Constitutional Guarantees, 17 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 137, 137
(2014). But see, e.g., Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex
Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 806 n.282 (2012) (stating that “it
is highly unlikely that the Court will consider its summary dismissal of the appeal in
Baker v. Nelson”).
60 Lyle Denniston, Gay Marriage and Baker v. Nelson, SCOTUSBLOG (July 4,
2012, 4:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/gay-marriage-and-baker-v-nelson/
[http://perma.cc/7Z3T-L9QE]; see, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(upholding a Georgia law that made it a crime for adult gay couples to engage in
homosexual acts in private); Hatcher v. Hatcher, 580 S.W.2d 475, 483 (1979) (stating
that Baker v. Nelson set the precedent that “there are no ‘equal protection’ barriers to a
state’s requiring that husbands be males and wives be females”); Lockyer v. City and
Cty. of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 504 (Cal. 2004) (stating that Baker v. Nelson
“prevents lower courts and public officials from coming to the conclusion that a state
law barring marriage between persons of the same sex violates the equal protection or
due process guarantees of the United States Constitution”); Hernandez v. Robles, 805
N.Y.S.2d 354, 369 (2005) (stating that “[t]he summary disposition in Baker v. Nelson
control[led] the disposition of the state equal protection claim brought [in this case]”).
61 See Monica Hof Wallace & Christopher Gerald Otten, Marriage Equality:
The “States” of the Law Post Windsor and Perry, 16 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 239 (2014);
Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle Bargle”: The
Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17 (2014);
Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States
v. Windsor, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117 (2013).
62 Marcus, supra note 61; Wallace & Otten, supra note 61; Young & Blondel,
supra note 61.
63 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
64 See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010); Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056
(D. Alaska 2014); Connolly v. Jeanes, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (D. Ariz. 2014); Majors v.
Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (D. Ariz. 2014); Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-CV-01817-RM-
KLM, 2014 WL 3634834 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014); Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278
(N.D. Fla. 2014); Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey,
970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis.
2014); Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014); In
reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Brinkman v. Long, No. 2013CV032572, 2014
WL 6805822 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2014); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
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consideration of the issue in Obergefell v. Hodges, the nation’s
courts heard nearly 60 challenges to same-sex marriage bans.65
In the overwhelming majority of these 60 cases, courts upheld
marriage equality, finding that same-sex marriage bans violate
the guarantees inherent in the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 Prior to
Obergefell, 37 states and Washington, D.C., recognized same-sex
marriage, in part as a result of those cases striking down same-
sex marriage bans.67
Remarkably, among the 37 states in which same-sex
couples could marry pre-Obergefell, 20 of those states were bound
by precedent set by federal judges appointed under Article III of
the U.S. Constitution.68 While courts in Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, Hawaii, and California ruled in
favor of marriage equality, all of the deciding judges were also
407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003);
Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865
(N.M. 2013).
65 See, e.g., Bostic, 760 F.3d 352; Perry, 591 F.3d 1147; Hamby, 56 F. Supp. 3d
1056; Connolly, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1094; Majors, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313; Burns, No. 14-CV-
01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 3634834; Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014);
Rolando, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227; Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456; Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982;
Guzzo, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384;
Brinkman, No. 2013CV032572, 2014 WL 6805822; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407; Goodridge,
798 N.E.2d 941; Garden State Equal., 79 A.3d 1036; Griego, 316 P.3d 865.
66 See, e.g., Bostic, 760 F.3d 352; Perry, 591 F.3d 1147; Hamby, 56 F. Supp. 3d
1056; Connolly, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1094; Majors, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313; Burns, No. 14-CV-
01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 3634834; Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014);
Rolando, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227; Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456; Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982;
Guzzo, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384;
Brinkman, No. 2013CV032572, 2014 WL 6805822; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407; Goodridge,
798 N.E.2d 941; Garden State Equal., 79 A.3d 1036; Griego, 316 P.3d 865.
67 Steven D. Schwinn, Marriage Equality: Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Require States to License a Marriage Between Two People of the Same Sex and to
Recognize a Valid Out-of-State Marriage Between Two People of the Same Sex?, 42
PREVIEW 261 (2015). The states that recognized same-sex marriage pre-Obergefell
include Alabama (2015), Alaska (2014), Arizona (2014), California (2013), Colorado
(2014), Connecticut (2008), Delaware (2013), Florida (2015), Hawaii (2013), Idaho
(2014), Illinois (2014), Indiana (2014), Iowa (2009), Kansas (2014), Maine (2012),
Maryland (2013), Massachusetts (2004), Minnesota (2013), Montana (2014), Nevada
(2014), New Hampshire (2010), New Jersey (2013), New Mexico (2013), New York
(2011), North Carolina (2014), Oklahoma (2014), Oregon (2014), Pennsylvania (2014),
Rhode Island (2013), South Carolina (2014), Utah (2014), Vermont (2009), Virginia
(2014), Washington (2013), West Virginia (2014), Wisconsin (2014), and Wyoming
(2014), as well as the District of Columbia (2010). Id.; see Winning the Freedom to
Marry Nationwide: The Inside Story of a Transformative Campaign, FREEDOM TO
MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-happened [http://perma.cc/6KEL-
SHQW] (last visited May 10, 2016).
68 See Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide, supra note 67; Billy
Corriher & Eric Lesh, Marriage Equality Cases Languish Before Elected Judges, L.A.
TIMES (June 1, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-corriher-
lesh-gay-marriage-lawsuits-20150601-story.html [http://perma.cc/FU5J-9MY3].
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appointed.69 “Like federal judges with life tenure, they felt at
liberty to side with equal marriage rights for same-sex couples,
even if in so doing they were siding against the majority.”70
A sharp and revealing contrast existed in states like Texas
and Arkansas, where elected judges had been called upon to
decide the controversial and politically polarizing same-sex
marriage debate.71 In Texas and Arkansas, where judges run for
office and have to worry about their political careers, the plaintiffs
in the same-sex marriage cases waited for an unreasonably
extensive amount of time for the judges’ decisions.72 Instead of
taking a stand on the issue and risking disappointing their
constituents, the Arkansas and Texas judges delayed their
rulings, hoping that the U.S. Supreme Court would decide the
issue once and for all and that they would escape unscathed.73
While the Texas Supreme Court had been mute, Arkansas’s
highest court had taken affirmative steps to avoid deciding the
same-sex marriage issue.74 After Arkansas Circuit Judge Chris
Piazza ruled in May 2014 that the state’s same-sex marriage ban
was unconstitutional by comparing the same-sex marriage debate
to the interracial marriage question decided by the Supreme Court
in 1967’s Loving v. Virginia,75 169 same-sex couples applied for
marriage licenses in Pulaski County, Arkansas.76 After the state
appealed, the Arkansas Supreme Court swiftly stayed Judge
Piazza’s decision, placing the same-sex couples that obtained
marriage licenses during the week after his decision in legal
69 Corriher & Lesh, supra note 68.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Max Brantley, Arkansas Supreme Court Injects More Delay into Same-Sex
Marriage Case, ARK. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.arktimes.com/
ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/02/05/arkansas-supreme-court-injects-more-delay-into-same-
sex-marriage-case [http://perma.cc/9QKF-FHJ3]; Robert T. Garrett, Texas Supreme Court
Declines to Take Up Same-Sex Divorce Judge Case, DALL. MORNINGNEWS (June 19, 2015,
11:38 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/state/headlines/20150619-texas-supreme-
court-declines-to-take-up-same-sex-divorce-judge-case.ece [http://perma.cc/TL9U-4N9C]
(refusing to decide whether to affirm a divorce issued in 2010 for a same-sex couple).
During the pendency of their appeal, one of the spouses died. But see Paul J. Weber,
Texas Supreme Court Upholds Divorce of Same-Sex Couple, BOS. GLOBE (June 20, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/06/19/texas-supreme-court-upholds-divo
rce-same-sex-couple/KRf39pNifGEVJeknf3hItJ/story.html [http://perma.cc/334W-56MK].
73 Brantley, supra note 72; Garrett, supra note 72.
74 Brantley, supra note 72; Garrett, supra note 72.
75 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
76 Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1908815 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 9,
2014); Gavin Lesnick, Same-Sex Couples Marry in Pulaski County: McDaniel Seeks Stay,
ARK. ONLINE (May 12, 2014, 6:44 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2014/may/12/
crowd-gathers-pulaski-county-issues-first-same-sex/ [http://perma.cc/BG8F-B3BA].
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limbo.77 In November 2014, oral arguments were held before the
state high court.78 But by January 2015, the makeup of the court
changed, creating questions surrounding which justices would
decide the case.79 When a majority of the court inexplicably
opened a new case sua sponte to consider whom of the then
presiding justices should hear the case, Justice Jim Hannah
recused himself from the new case, claiming that the majority had
“created out of whole cloth an issue to delay the disposition” of the
marriage equality lawsuit.80 Justice Paul Danielson also recused
himself, writing that he could not ethically be “complicit
in . . . depriving justice to any party before this court.”81
After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell on
June 26, 2015, the Arkansas Supreme Court released a three-
sentence order dismissing the same-sex marriage case as moot.82
Ultimately, the elected justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court
were able to dodge the controversial same-sex marriage question
by ducking behind the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion.
By election to the bench through popular vote, elected
justices owe their jobs to the electorate. Through the courts’
rulings, the majority of the populace essentially becomes the
decisionmaker, albeit through the courts. While, arguably,
decisions from elected judges may be more reflective of the will of
the populace, all judges are trusted to make apolitical decisions in
upholding the spirit of the Constitution.
Just as elected judges have to consider the electorate’s
views, so too do politicians. After Obergefell, politicians in
southern conservative states voiced disapproval of the Court’s
decision. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton described the
Supreme Court ruling as “[a] judge-based edict that is not based
77 Max Brantley, Arkansas Supreme Court on Marriage Case: Delay, Delay, and
a Change of Heart, ARK. TIMES (June 28, 2015, 1:23 PM), http://www.arktimes.com/
ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/06/28/arkansas-supreme-court-moved-from-support-to-oppos
ition-to-a-quiet-fold-on-marriage-equality-sources-say [http://perma.cc/L2BR-9CWW]
(providing a timeline of the Arkansas State same-sex marriage litigation).
78 Id.
79 Max Brantley, UPDATE: Justices Hannah and Danielson Recuse from New
Marriage Case; Cite Delaying Tactic, Ethical Concerns, ARK. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015, 3:58
PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/04/08/marriage-case-gets-
curioser-justice-danielson-recuses-from-new-case [http://perma.cc/9MLL-WFR5].
80 Letter from Chief Justice Jim Hannah to Justice Paul Danielson (Apr. 8,
2015), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/04/08/marriage-case-gets-
curioser-justice-danielson-recuses-from-new-case [http://perma.cc/9MLL-WFR5] (reprinting
the letter from Chief Justice Hannah).
81 Letter from Justice Paul E. Danielson to Chief Justice Jim Hannah (Apr. 8,
2015), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/04/08/marriage-case-gets-
curioser-justice-danielson-recuses-from-new-case [http://perma.cc/9MLL-WFR5] (reprinting
the letter from Justice Danielson).
82 Smith v. Wright, CV-14-427, 2015 Ark. Lexis 504 (Ark. June 26, 2015).
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in the law.”83 Alabama’s Chief Justice Moore called the decision
“federal tyranny.”84 Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal scoffed,
“Marriage between a man and a woman was established by God,
and no earthly court can alter that.”85 These comments were
likely motivated by the political desire to remain in the good
graces of the electoral majority. Ultimately, politicians represent
their constituents, and at the end of their terms, they must seek
reelection—a factor that drives many of their decisions (and
positions) while in office. While elected officials should be
accountable to their voters, the judiciary is intended to serve as a
check on the political branch, enforcing constitutionally protected
liberty interests even when such enforcement furthers a
countermajoritarian position. This system of checks and balances,
however, breaks down when some judges are elected.
C. Building on Obergefell’s Momentum: A Move Toward
Nationwide Equality
Like any other controversial civil rights issue, the
response to the Obergefell decision was sharply divided. While the
marriage equality opponents used their political platforms to
denounce the Court’s decision, invoking their conscience86 and the
argument that no five Justices can decide an issue that is
ultimately within the province of a higher being,87 Democratic
leaders in Congress rallied together to build on the momentum of
the Court’s decision.88 Only a month after the Obergefell decision,
U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley from Oregon and Rhode Island
83 Eliott C. McLaughlin, Most States to Abide by Same-Sex Marriage Ruling,
but . . ., CNN (June 30, 2015, 8:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/29/us/same-sex-
marriage-state-by-state/ [http://perma.cc/QE9G-QC6S]. Attorney General Paxton
emphatically warned that
no court, no law, no rule, and no words will change the simple truth that
marriage is the union of one man and one woman. Nothing will change the
importance of a mother and a father to the raising of a child. And nothing
will change our collective resolve that all Americans should be able to
exercise their faith in their daily lives without infringement and harassment.
Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. (quoting Governor Bobby Jindal).
86 Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2014); Elizabeth Sepper,
Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703 (2014).
87 See Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 86.
88 Brandon Lorenz, Historic Marriage Equality Ruling Generates Momentum for
New Non-Discrimination Law, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 7, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/
blog/entry/historic-marriage-equality-ruling-generates-momentum-for-new-non-discrimina
[http://perma.cc/2RVF-FQ6B].
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Representative David Cicilline (who is openly gay) introduced the
Equality Act, a comprehensive, broadly sweeping piece of
legislation that would prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity in eight categories.89 If
passed, the Equality Act would amend the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity in places of public accommodation, housing,
public education, employment, and other areas where
discrimination on other protected bases is already prohibited.90
As justification for the bill, cosponsor Representative
Cicilline pointed out that “[i]n most states, a same-sex couple
can get married on Saturday, post pictures on Facebook on
Sunday, and then risk being fired from their job or kicked out
of their apartment on Monday.”91 Cicilline urged Congress to
recognize that “[a] majority of states in our country do not have
laws that protect LGBT individuals against discrimination. . . .
We need a uniform federal standard that protects all LGBT
Americans from discrimination.”92
Despite the need for such a protection, it is unlikely that
Congress will pass the Equality Act.93 Given the Republican
majority and the track record for other, narrower pieces of LGBT-
friendly legislation, the Equality Act seems doomed from the
start.94 Indeed, the narrower Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (ENDA) prohibited discrimination on the same bases, but
exclusively in the employment context.95 The ENDA was first
introduced in Congress in 1994, and different iterations of the bill
have been considered almost every year since.96 It has failed every
time, however, in great part due to its opponents’ concern that it
is overly broad.97 Certainly, if the ENDA, which only applies to
89 Equality Act, S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong.
(2015); Sophia Tesfaye, “The Equality Act”: Democrats Push Bill Banning LGBT
Discrimination, SALON (July 23, 2015, 11:24 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/07/23/the_equ
ality_act_democrats_push_bill_banning_lgbt_discrimination/ [http://perma.cc/63U3-6ESR].
90 Tesfaye, supra note 89; Dana Beyer, The Equality Act, Part One—
Introduction, HUFFINGTON POST: GAY VOICES (July 27, 2015, 12:48 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dana-beyer/the-equality-act-part-one_b_7880612.html
[http://perma.cc/ZE3D-X6PU].
91 Tesfaye, supra note 89 (quoting Rep. David Cicilline).
92 Id. (quoting Rep. David Cicilline).
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 Beyer, supra note 90.
96 Ed O’Keefe, ENDA, Explained, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/11/04/what-is-the-employment-
non-discrimination-act-enda [http://perma.cc/GC3V-D6PN].
97 Id.
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the workplace, is too broad for opponents of LGBT rights, the
Equality Act will be a nonstarter.98
II. STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS TO EXPAND OR CONTRACT
LGBT CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Preempting Local Civil Rights in Arkansas
In response to the adoption of LGBT-protective
ordinances and in anticipation of the Court’s same-sex marriage
decision, states began passing legislation that prohibits
municipalities from carving out antidiscrimination protections
for members of the LGBT community. Fearing that sexual
orientation would be labeled as a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
these state initiatives were intended to block the efforts of
progressive local communities.99
Following the efforts of the progressive-minded university
town of Fayetteville to prohibit discrimination on the bases of
sexual orientation and gender identity, Arkansas Senator Bart
Hester sponsored Senate Bill 202, the Intrastate Commerce
Improvement Act.100 It was swiftly passed by the state assembly
and, although never officially signed into law by Governor Asa
Hutchinson, became law in 2015.101 The Intrastate Commerce
Improvement Act, nicknamed Hester’s Law, prohibits a
municipality or political subdivision of the state from “adopt[ing]
or enforc[ing] an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates
a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis
not contained in state law.”102 Its purpose is “to improve intrastate
commerce by ensuring that businesses, organizations and
employers doing business in the state are subject to uniform
98 See, e.g., Justin Wm. Moyer, Why Houston’s Gay Rights Ordinance Failed:
Fear of Men in Women’s Bathrooms, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/03/why-houstons-gay-
rights-ordinance-failed-bathrooms/ [http://perma.cc/L2QZ-HX9V] (explaining that
Houston’s LGBT civil rights measure failed in large part due to the concern
surrounding transgender individuals’ use of the restroom that corresponds to their
gender identity).
99 See, e.g., Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act, H.B. 600, 107th Gen.
Assemb. (Tenn. 2011); Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, S.B. 202, 90th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015).
100 S.B. 202, 90th Gen. Assemb. (Ark. 2015).
101 Guo, supra note 1; see also ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 15 (stating that “if any
bill shall not be returned by the Governor within five days, Sunday excepted, after it
shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he
signed it”).
102 ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-1-403(a) (West 2015).
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nondiscrimination laws and obligations.”103 Because Arkansas
antidiscrimination laws do not currently protect members of the
LGBT community, this law effectively preempts the rights of local
government to create such protections.104
On February 9, 2015, the Eureka Springs City Council
passed Ordinance 2223, a local law prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender
expression in housing, employment, and places of accommodation
within the city.105 Ordinance 2223 passed unanimously after the
City Council members hurried through the requisite three readings
in one night and unanimously resolved to oppose Hester’s Law.106
The Ordinance included an emergency clause to ensure that it took
effect as soon as possible following its enactment.107
Following Eureka Springs’s lead, the Arkansas cities of
Little Rock, North Little Rock, Conway, and Hot Springs passed
scaled-down nondiscrimination ordinances.108 These weakened
versions prohibited agencies and vendors that do business with
each city from discriminating on the basis of gender identity and
sexual orientation.109 The day before Hester’s Law took effect,
Senator Bart Hester himself admonished, “I think their
103 Id. § 14-1-402(a).
104 Id. But see supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining that the state
antibullying law protects elementary and secondary public school students from
bullying on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity).
105 Bill Bowden, Eureka Springs Quickly Passes Anti-Prejudice Law, ARK.
ONLINE (Feb. 10, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2015/feb/10/
eureka-springs-quickly-passes-anti-prej/?f=latest [http://perma.cc/U2UG-YHPJ]; Eureka
Springs, Ark., Ordinance No. 2223 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.cityofeurekasprings.us/
images/stories/ordinance/ORDINANCE%20NO.%202223%20-%20CIVIL%20RIGHTS%
20ADMINISTRATION.pdf [http://perma.cc/SU94-KMQ2] (stating that “the City of
Eureka Springs seeks to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons
to be free from unfair discrimination based on real or perceived race, ethnicity, national
origin, age, gender, gender identity, gender expression, familial status, marital status,
socioeconomic background, religion, sexual orientation, disability and veteran status,”
and “therefore, be it ordained by the City Council of the City of Eureka Springs,
Arkansas[,] . . . [t]hat all Ordinances or Resolutions, and parts thereof, in conflict with
this Ordinance are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict”).
106 Bowden, supra note 105.
107 Eureka Springs, Ark., Ordinance No. 2223 (Feb. 9, 2015) (“Emergency
Clause: That since there is a high likelihood that legislation of this type may become
unavailable to Arkansas cities and counties in the very near future; and since diversity
is an aspect of Eureka Springs that attracts residents and visitors, impacting not only
the economic well-being, and thereby the public peace, health and safety of the
community, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Ordinance shall take
effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”).
108 Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 21,031 (Apr. 21, 2015); Conway, Ark.,
Ordinance O-15-24 (Feb. 24, 2015); Hot Springs, Ark., Ordinance O-15-16 (2015); North
Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance O-15-19 (2015).
109 Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 21,031; Conway, Ark., Ordinance O-15-24;
Hot Springs, Ark., Ordinance O-15-16; North Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance O-15-19.
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ordinances are null and void. I think that’s very clear.”110 Little
Rock City Attorney Tom Carpenter disagreed. Pointing to places
in state law that seek to offer limited protections to individuals on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, like in the
state’s antibullying law, Tom Carpenter rebuked, “They’re not in
conflict . . . . There’s nothing mentioned in the city’s ordinance
that’s not already protected under state law.”111
After the Hot Springs Board of Directors passed an
NDO prohibiting the city and its vendors from discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, state
representative Mickey Gates of Hot Springs requested a formal
opinion from Attorney General Leslie Rutledge as to whether
Act 137 prohibits a city from enforcing “an ordinance that
conflicts with the act but that was passed before the act took
effect.”112 Attorney General Rutledge answered the question in
the affirmative.113
B. Other Measures Aimed at Preempting LGBT Rights
States like Montana, Michigan, Nebraska, and Oklahoma
have considered, but failed to pass, Hester-type laws.114 In similar
fashion, Tennessee’s Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act,
passed in 2011, prohibits local governments from adopting
ordinances or other legal measures that “impose on or make
applicable to any person an anti-discrimination practice,
standard, definition, or provision that shall deviate
from, . . . supplement, . . . [or] change” existing state law
antidiscrimination protections.115 The Equal Access to Intrastate
Commerce Act was applied retroactively, voiding any local
110 John Lyon, New Law Seeks to Bar Anti-Discrimination Ordinances, but
Interpretations Vary, ARK. NEWS (July 22, 2015, 5:19 PM), http://arkansasnews.com/
news/arkansas/new-law-seeks-bar-anti-discrimination-ordinances-interpretations-vary
#sthash.4u8n4VLa.dpuf [http://perma.cc/CH4P-6T6D]; see also David Koon, Testing the
Discrimination Law, Where We Go Next on the State’s LGBT Fairness Ordinances, ARK.
TIMES (May 28, 2015), http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/testing-the-discrimination-
law/Content?oid=3871873 [http://perma.cc/G9VH-6T5A].
111 Lyon, supra note 110.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 H.B. 516, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011) (died in committee); H.B. 5039,
96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (same); Legis. B. 912, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012)
(indefinitely postponed); H.B. 2445, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012) (died in committee).
The authors suspect that other states will follow suit.
115 TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-51-1802 (2015).
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measure that was passed in a way that would violate the Act
prior to its effective date.116
The proposed Intrastate Commerce Improvement Acts in
Texas and West Virginia, which are currently undergoing the
legislative process, are nearly identical.117 They would prohibit
municipalities from “adopt[ing] or enforc[ing] a local law that
creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a
basis not contained in” state law.118 If passed, the Texas and West
Virginia Intrastate Commerce Improvement Acts would essentially
disallow municipalities from passing laws that expand or provide
greater civil rights protections than existing state law.119 While it
seems that the will of the people should rule in a representative
democracy, the majority of the Court disagreed in Obergefell with
respect to the rights of same-sex couples to marry.120
III. A TALE OF TWO POLITICAL PROCESSES
A. “We the People”
In the Court’s recent decision recognizing that the
fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples, the
four dissenting Justices criticized the majority’s ruling in favor
of same-sex marriage for removing the issue from public
116 Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act, Op. Att’y. Gen. No. 11-36, 2011
WL 3013844 (Apr. 21, 2011).
117 Compare H.B. 1556, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015) (as of November 12,
2015, the Bill was referred to the House Urban Affairs Committee), and S.B. 1155,
2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015) (as of November 12, 2015, the Bill was referred to the
Senate State Affairs Committee), with H.B. 2881, 2015 Leg., 82d Reg. Sess. (W. Va.
2015) (as of November 12, 2015, the bill was recommitted to governmental organization
upon first reading).
118 Tex. H.B. 1556; Tex. S.B. 1155; W. Va. H.B. 2881.
119 Tex. H.B. 1556; Tex. S.B. 1155; W. Va. H.B. 2881.
120 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015) (recognizing that
“[w]hile the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for
change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting
a fundamental right”).
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debate.121 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts defined the issue
in Obergefell as “who decides what constitutes ‘marriage.’”122
The dissenting Justices decried the fact that the five
Justices joining in the majority opinion had changed “the
meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture
throughout human history.”123 Viewing the majority decision as
“[s]tealing th[e] issue from the people,”124 the dissenting Justices
lamented that the decision stills public debate on “a question the
Constitution leaves to the people.”125
Whether couched in criticisms of judicial policymaking,
federalism, the creation of new rights, or redefining an
understanding of marriage that is as old as human civilization, the
recurring themes of the dissenting opinions view Obergefell as a
defeat for the democratic process.126 Justice Scalia called the
Court’s opinion a “threat to American democracy.”127
According to Justice Thomas, the political process protects
liberty.128 He has posited that as a representative democracy, “we
the people’s” liberty is most secure when government acts through
its elected officials or by popular vote.129 This notion of political
process is at odds with a view of individual liberty that does not
depend upon the consent of the majority.130
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy responded to
the dissenters’ insistence that the majority erroneously silenced
public debate in deciding the issue.131 Indeed, Justice Kennedy
catalogued the extensive public debate in all aspects of society on
121 Id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (opining that “by deciding [the same-
sex marriage] question under the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of
democratic decision. There will be consequences to shutting down the political process
on an issue of such profound public significance. Closing debate tends to close minds.
People denied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does
not seem to be the sort of thing courts usually decide”). After scolding the majority of
the Court for removing the “issue from the political process,” Justice Scalia stated,
“With each decision of ours that takes from the People a question properly left to
them—with each decision that is unabashedly based not on law, but on the ‘reasoned
judgment’ of a bare majority of this Court—we move one step closer to being reminded
of our impotence.” Id. at 2627, 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2625-28 (Roberts, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 2631-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 2637 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1636
(2014) (“The freedom secured by the Constitution consists . . . of the right of the
individual not to be injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental power.”).
131 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2595-97.
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the issue of same-sex marriage.132 From referenda and legislative
debates to discussion in public and private institutions and the
halls of academia, Justice Kennedy rebuffed the dissenters’
criticism, pointing out that the issue had been thoroughly
discussed, studied, and litigated.133 Ultimately, in deciding the
issue, Justice Kennedy emphasized that individual fundamental
rights cannot wait for the political process to recognize or bestow
those rights.134 “[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to a
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”135
The debate about which public controversies should be
subject to contests at the ballot box or legislative consent is not
unique to the issue of same-sex marriage.136 Just last term, the
Court addressed the right of the voting majority to ban
affirmative action in admissions to public educational
institutions.137 Reviewing the constitutionality of Michigan’s
amendment to its state constitution banning affirmative action, in
Schuette the Court determined that this controversial issue
should be left to the wisdom of the voting public.138 Prior to
Proposal 2, independent university boards of trustees decided all
admissions policies, including those based on race.139 Under the
proposal, however, affirmative action admissions policies would
be totally banned by law and would no longer be at the discretion
of university trustees. In deciding the constitutionality of
Michigan’s Proposal 2—now Article I, section 26, of the state
constitution—the plurality and dissenting opinions set forth very
different approaches to the question of constitutionality.140 The
majority of Michigan voters had voted to ban race-based
admissions policies (and only those policies) through “a higher
plane of the existing political process”—a constitutional
amendment.141 The dissenting opinion argued that such
interference in the political process to create greater hurdles for
race-favorable admissions policies should trigger strict scrutiny
review under an equal protection analysis in this context, the
political process doctrine.142 Unlike the same-sex marriage
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2591.
135 Id. at 2606 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
136 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By AnyMeansNecessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014).
137 Id. at 1630.
138 Id. at 1637-38.
139 Id. at 1626, 1662.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1662 n.7 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1662.
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question, however, the Schuette plurality decided that the issue
should be left to the “will of the people” and that the vote to
amend Michigan’s constitution to ban affirmative action in college
admissions did not implicate constitutional concerns.143 Therefore,
section 26 of Michigan’s constitution stands.144
B. Judicially Created Doctrine
Invoking the judicially created doctrine that courts have
traditionally applied to laws that are alleged to disenfranchise
African-Americans, this article posits that the injuries caused
by Hester-type laws are precisely the injuries the doctrine was
designed to protect and thus mandate the application of the
doctrine here.
Pre-Schuette, the Court viewed ballot initiatives that
targeted minorities in a way that negatively impacted their equal
access to the political process with much less deference than the
Court afforded the Michigan voters.145 In rare cases, the Supreme
Court has applied strict scrutiny to government restructuring that
impedes minorities’ equal participation in the political process.146
An example of governmental restructuring that had a
discriminatory effect on a racial minority was challenged in
Hunter v. Erickson.147 In Hunter, the citizens of Akron, Ohio,
voted to amend the City Charter in a way that nullified an
antidiscrimination housing ordinance.148 The amendment to the
City Charter “prevented the city council from implementing any
ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral
discrimination in housing without the approval of the majority of
the city’s voters.”149 The Court found the Charter Amendment
unconstitutional because it “place[d] special burdens on racial
[and other] minorities within the governmental process.”150 The
Charter’s amendment singled out antidiscrimination housing
ordinances and required the majority of voters’ approval to adopt
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
146 Perry, 548 U.S. at 517-18; Romer, 517 U.S. at 628-29; Washington v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,
391 (1969).
147 Hunter, 393 U.S. 385.
148 Id. at 386-87.
149 Ann K. Wooster, Equal Protection and Due Process Clause Challenges
Based on Racial Discrimination—Supreme Court Cases, 172 A.L.R. Fed. 1, § 17 (2001)
(interpreting Hunter, 393 U.S. 365).
150 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
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such ordinances in the future.151 Any other type of ordinance could
be passed by the city council without the voting majority’s pre-
approval.152 But because the Charter Amendment had a
discriminatory effect on a minority group and denied equal access
to the political process, the Court applied the political process
doctrine, which triggers strict scrutiny judicial review.153
In a subsequent case applying the political process
doctrine, the Court in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1
invalidated a state initiative that banned busing as a means to
desegregate schools in the district.154 The initiative targeted
busing for purposes of desegregation only; the school district
maintained authority to bus children for other purposes.155 The
result of this initiative was to “remov[e] the authority to
address a racial problem—and only a racial problem—from the
existing decisionmaking body.”156 After the initiative,
proponents of busing had to “seek relief from the state
legislature, or from the statewide electorate.”157 This was much
more onerous than the previous process, which gave authority
for such decisions to the school board.158 As in Hunter, the
Court recognized that “[t]he sovereignty of the people is itself
subject to . . . constitutional limitations.”159
The judicially created political process doctrine marries
equal protection and First Amendment jurisprudence,160
“focus[ing] on the discriminatory effect of government
restructuring.”161 Just as the Akron voters amended the City
Charter, nullifying an existing antidiscrimination housing
ordinance and requiring special hurdles to enact future
antidiscrimination housing ordinances in the city, Seattle voters
removed authority to implement a desegregation busing plan
from the local school board.162 These laws, which changed the
rules of political decisionmaking “in the middle of the game”163
and negatively affected minorities, were subject to strict
151 Id. at 389-90.
152 Id. at 390.
153 Id. at 391.
154 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 474.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
160 RODNEYA.SMOLLA, 1SMOLLA&NIMMERONFREEDOMOFSPEECH § 13:43 (2014).
161 D’Alessio, supra note 22, at 108.
162 Washington, 453 U.S. at 474.
163 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By AnyMeansNecessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1653 (2014).
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scrutiny.164 Therefore, actions that change a previously established
political decisionmaking process, block meaningful access to the
political process, and burden minorities from achieving beneficial
legislation are presumptively unconstitutional.165
Even under rational basis review, the Court declared
unconstitutional a Colorado initiative that amended the state
constitution and banned antidiscrimination laws protecting
persons on the basis of sexual orientation.166 Like the
amendment to the Akron City Charter and the Seattle initiative,
the Colorado amendment restructured the political process,
requiring those who would seek protection from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation to persuade the majority of
voters to repeal the constitutional amendment in order to pass
favorable antidiscrimination laws.167 The Colorado Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny review pursuant to the political
process doctrine in analyzing the constitutionality of the
amendment.168 Although the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that
the amendment was unconstitutional, it declined to follow the
Colorado Supreme Court’s reasoning.169
The newly enacted Hester’s Law and others like it, which
prohibit the enactment of local NDOs that grant protections
extending beyond state law, have yet to be tested in the courts. It
remains to be seen, however, whether a court would view a
Hester-type law as being similar to the Michigan referendum or
as more akin to the Akron charter amendment in Hunter, the
state initiative in Seattle, or the Colorado constitutional
164 Id. at 1663.
165 Washington, 458 U.S. at 467.
166 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996).
167 Id.
168 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276-82 (Colo. 1993) (analyzing and
holding that previous reapportionment cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
support the conclusion that under the Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny applies
to legislation that infringes on any group’s fundamental right to participate equally in
the political process, regardless of whether the group is a suspect class or not).
169 Compare Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1342-49 (Colo. 1994) (holding that
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause under the strict scrutiny standard
because none of the state’s asserted governmental interests—(1) protecting the sanctity of
religious, familial, and personal privacy; (2) ensuring that limited state resources are
dedicated to the protection of suspect classes only; (3) allowing the people themselves to
establish social and moral norms; (4) preventing government from supporting special
interest groups’ political objectives; and (5) determining factionalism within the
government—were necessary and compelling state interests for which Amendment 2 was
narrowly tailored to serve), with Romer, 517 U.S. at 630-35 (finding that Amendment 2
did not meet the rational basis standard because (1) it was at once too narrow in its
identification of persons by a single trait and too broad in denying the identified group
protection across the board, and (2) it lacked any identifiable legitimate purpose and was
instead born out of animosity toward LGBT individuals).
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amendment in Romer. Although the Schuette majority declined to
apply the political process doctrine to the Michigan referendum,170
the doctrine is not totally irrelevant to the constitutionality
question for legislative acts such as Hester’s Law. In theory,
government action such as Hester’s Law is exactly the type of
government restructuring that the political process doctrine was
designed to prevent, because it disenfranchises the LGBT
community from obtaining beneficial legislation.
IV. THE POLITICAL PROCESSDOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO THE
LGBT CIVIL RIGHTSMOVEMENT
While there have been many legal victories for the LGBT
community,171 most of those victories have been achieved at a
local level through political decisionmaking—where the
opportunity to participate in self-governance and influence
policymakers is most direct172—or in federal courts.173 Certainly,
the closer a particular group is to the decisionmaker, the easier it
becomes to obtain beneficial legislation at the local level.174 But as
battles to gain full civil rights for members of the LGBT
community have been waged and won, voters at large have
successfully overturned many of those hard-fought victories
170 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By AnyMeansNecessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1643 (2014).
171 See, e.g., Stephen Peters, HUGE LEGAL VICTORY: New Jersey Jury Finds
That Anti-LGBT Conversion Therapy Is Fraud, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 25, 2015),
http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/huge-legal-victory-jury-finds-that-anti-lgbt-conversion-therap
y-is-fraud [http://perma.cc/ND67-T4HX]; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-
Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/8DFH-4EBZ];
BREAKING: Eureka Springs Votes to Uphold Ordinance Protecting LGBT Residents, HUM.
RTS. CAMPAIGN (May 13, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/breaking-eureka-springs-
votes-to-uphold-ordinance-protecting-lgbt-residents [http://perma.cc/GFH2-BPYS]; HRC
Staff, Victory: San Antonio City Council Approves LGBT-Inclusive Updates to Ordinance,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/victory-san-antonio-city-
council-approves-lgbt-inclusive-updates-to-ordinan [http://perma.cc/BJP8-C33R].
172 See Tony Merevick, Cities, Small Towns Across America Attempt to Fill Gaps in
LGBT Rights, BUZZFEED LGBT (Aug. 18, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
tonymerevick/cities-small-towns-across-america-attempt-to-fill-gaps-in-lg#.ktpR0G7Zb
[http://perma.cc/YP2V-GR89].
173 FreedomtoMarry.org reports that, of the 65 victories for same-sex marriage
since the Court’s landmark June 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor, “[f]orty-one
pro-marriage rulings have been issued in federal court, eighteen have been issued in
state court, and five have been issued by a federal appellate court.” Marriage Rulings
in the Courts, FREEDOM TO MARRY (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/
pages/marriage-rulings-in-the-courts [http://perma.cc/LP6P-YFKU].
174 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982);
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
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through statewide referendums.175 Although there is no
constitutional guarantee that voters will win, there is an implied
right that guarantees equal participation in self-governance.176
When the voting majority blocks a minority group’s
equal access to self-governance by governmental restructuring,
both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause are
implicated.177 Similar to Akron’s charter amendment, Seattle’s
desegregation busing ban, and Colorado’s Amendment 2,
Hester-type laws require the voting majority’s approval for any
governmental entity to adopt nondiscrimination ordinances.178
But the Supreme Court has never applied the political process
doctrine to cases other than those affecting racial minorities.179
Only the Colorado Supreme Court180 and a federal district
court181 have applied the political process doctrine to legislation
that disadvantaged members of the LGBT community “by
making it more difficult [for that group] to enact legislation on
175 See FADERMAN ET AL., supra note 17; KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at
6; MURDOCH& PRICE, supra note 17.
176 The Constitution “guarantees that the majority may not win by stacking
the political process against minority groups permanently, forcing the minority alone to
surmount unique obstacles in pursuit of its goals.” Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1654
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
177 SMOLLA, supra note 160, § 13:43 (“The ‘political process doctrine’ is a
unique and often controversial doctrine of constitutional law that resides at the
intersection of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, including the ‘state action’
doctrine, which normally requires governmental, as opposed to private, discrimination
to trigger an Equal Protection Clause violation, and First Amendment principles,
which protect robust public discourse in the political marketplace.”).
178 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1-401 to -403. (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-
102 (West 2012); H.B. 1556, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015); H.B. 2881, 2015 Leg.,
82d Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015); H.B. 516, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011) (died in
standing committee); H.B. 5039, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (same); Legis. B.
912, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012) (indefinitely postponed).
179 See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (considering the
constitutionality of a statewide referendum repealing sections of the California Civil Code
that banned racial discrimination in the sale of residential property); Hunter, 393 U.S. 385
(considering the constitutionality of an amendment to the Akron City Charter by the city
council requiring approval by a majority vote of the electors for the passage of any fair
housing ordinance regulating use, sale, advertisements, transfer, listing assignment, lease,
sublease, or financing of realty on basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (considering the constitutionality of a referendum that
prohibited racially integrated busing).
180 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (Evans I) (granting preliminary
injunction and applying strict scrutiny to Amendment 2, which prohibited any
government entity from extending antidiscrimination protections on the basis of
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships); Evans
v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (Evans II) (granting permanent injunction under
same reasoning as Evans I).
181 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417
(S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d by Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
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its behalf.”182 Since the few cases183 in which the Supreme Court
has invoked the political process doctrine involved challenges
to laws that “‘regulate[] a racial subject matter’ . . . ‘to the
detriment of the racial minority,’”184 application of this doctrine
to laws placing special burdens on the LGBT community is
purely theoretical.
In fact, the continued vitality of the political process
doctrine as a whole is in question after Schuette v. BAMN.185 In
Schuette, the Court upheld an amendment to the Michigan
constitution prohibiting public colleges and universities from
using race-based preferences in admissions.186 Prior to the
statewide referendum, the Michigan constitution delegated
plenary power, which included promulgating admissions policies
for public universities, to independent boards of trustees.187 In her
dissent, Justice Sotomayor viewed section 26 of Michigan’s
constitution as “chang[ing] the rules in the middle of the game” in
a way that allowed the voting majority to diminish a racial
minority group’s exercise of political power.188
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, made a
strong case for the continued vitality of the political process
doctrine and why it applied to invalidate Michigan’s Proposal 2,
now Article I, section 26, of the Michigan constitution.189 She
182 Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1341 n.4 (quoting Equal. Found. of Greater
Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. at 1241).
183 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 470 (finding a statewide initiative enjoining
a mandatory busing plan that integrated public schools unconstitutional because “the State
allocate[d] governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a
decision to determine the decisionmaking process”); Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386 (finding an
amendment to the city charter nullifying the city’s antidiscrimination housing ordinance
unconstitutional because preventing “the city council from implementing any ordinance
dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without the approval of
the majority” of the city’s voters violated the Equal Protection Clause); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967) (affirming California Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a state
referendum that amended the state constitution to give absolute discretion to private
persons to discriminate in housing, reasoning that the amendment involved the state in
private discrimination, which violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
184 D’Alessio, supra note 22, at 112 (quoting Amar & Caminker, supra note 22,
at 1029); see also Amar & Caminker, supra note 22, at 1024.
185 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
186 Id. at 1629 (upholding a statewide referendum, Proposal 2, to amend the state
constitution to abolish “preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race . . . in the operation of . . . public education”). Proposal 2, now Article I, section 26, of
Michigan’s constitution, also bans preferential treatment on the basis of “sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment [and] public contracting.”
Id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). However, the Schuette case only addressed the
issue of public education.
187 Id. at 1631, 1653.
188 Id. at 1651-53 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
189 Id.
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regarded this doctrine as a “fundamental strand of our equal
protection jurisprudence.”190 In her opinion, the doctrine continues
to be a necessary tool in the equal protection arsenal to fight the
“long and lamentable” history of the societal majority’s attempts
to block racial minorities’ equal access to the political process.191
Long after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, states
obstructed minorities’ right to vote—first with outright bans, then
“with literacy tests, good character requirements, poll taxes, and
gerrymandering.”192 According to Justice Sotomayor, Michigan’s
constitutional amendment is “the last chapter of discrimination.”193
Like the Akron city charter amendment in Hunter v.
Erickson194 and the state initiative banning school busing for
desegregation purposes in Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1,195 Michigan’s constitutional amendment removed race-
based admissions policy decisions from the decisionmaking
process.196 The challenged initiatives in Akron, Seattle, and
Michigan required the proponents of antidiscrimination housing
ordinances, school desegregation, and race-based admissions
policies to seek a constitutional or charter amendment or
statewide voter approval to achieve favorable legislation on these
race-sensitive issues.197
In Michigan, all other admissions policy decisions
remained with each public university’s eight-member governing
board.198 A Michigan citizen wanting favorable admissions
policies for veterans or for children of alumni only had to
convince a majority of the elected board members.199 But after
Michigan’s constitutional amendment, citizens proposing race-
based admissions preferences could only obtain such policies by
amending the state constitution.200
Justice Sotomayor posited, “§ 26 reconfigured the
political process in Michigan such that it is now more difficult
for racial minorities, and racial minorities alone, to achieve
legislation in their interest.”201 This is exactly the type of
restructuring to which the Court applied strict scrutiny in its
190 Id. at 1651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 1652 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
193 Id.
194 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
195 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
196 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651-53 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 1653; Hunter, 393 U.S. 385; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457.
198 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629-31, 1645 (majority opinion).
199 Id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1662 n.7 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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previous political process doctrine cases.202 As such, Justice
Sotomayor concluded that the Hunter and Seattle precedents
were indistinguishable from the Schuette case and that the
political process doctrine should have applied to invalidate the
Michigan constitutional amendment.203
The Justices joining the plurality opinion disagreed. In
determining that the political process doctrine did not apply to
the facts in Schuette, the Court limited the doctrine to
“cases . . . in which the political restriction in question was
designed to be used, or was likely to be used, to encourage
infliction of injury by reason of race”—in other words, intentional
discrimination.204 In clear and perhaps oversimplified language,
Chief Justice Roberts had earlier exclaimed that “[t]he way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.”205 Following that logic, Justice Scalia opined
that a facially neutral equal protection provision could not be a
constitutional violation.206 Justice Scalia’s concurrence would have
gone even further and put the death knell on the political process
doctrine by overruling the cases in which the doctrine was first
articulated.207 Referring to the triggering prong of the political
process doctrine, which requires the court to determine whether a
law challenged on the basis of a change in policymaking authority
concerns a racial matter, Justice Scalia stated that “[n]o good can
come of such random judicial musing.”208
Post-Schuette, it is unclear how much of the political
process doctrine still survives. As a matter of legal precedent and
theory, it is unlikely a court would apply the political process
doctrine to laws that change the political decisionmaking
authority with the purpose or likelihood of injuring the LGBT
community’s equal participation in self-governance. Despite the
Court’s narrow application of the doctrine, it was intended to
remedy the injury resulting from the restructuring of governmental
decisionmaking processes to the detriment of a disenfranchised
community.209 As discussed in Part II, this precise injury has
202 Hunter, 393 U.S. 385; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457.
203 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1667-68.
204 Id. at 1638.
205 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007).
206 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207 Id. at 1641 (Scalia, J., concurring).
208 Id. at 1643 (Scalia, J., concurring).
209 Id. at 1662-63 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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afflicted the LGBT community over and over again, particularly
in recent history.210
While the evidence is foolproof that the majority of
society has inflicted this precise injury upon the LGBT
community, the doctrinal “fit” of the political process doctrine
to this group is problematic. First, the political process doctrine
concerns race-based laws.211 Discriminatory classifications
based on race are suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny
under an equal protection analysis.212 Second, as the political
process doctrine sits at the intersection of equal protection and
the First Amendment, it promises equality at the ballot box.
From Reconstruction to the present, the right to vote and to
petition government decisionmakers has been crucial to
achieving racial equality.213 The political process doctrine
prohibits “political restructurings that create one process for
racial minorities and a separate, less burdensome process for
everyone else.”214
Unlike members of racial minorities, members of the
LGBT community have not yet been systematically targeted with
obstructionist measures to block their community from the ballot
box.215 Therefore, absent a longstanding history preventing
members of the LGBT community from voting, the First
Amendment concern embedded in the political process doctrine—
protecting racial minorities’ equal participation in self-
governance—does not apply to the LGBT community.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is triggered when the government treats similarly
210 See supra notes 92-120 and accompanying text.
211 The political process doctrine is triggered when (1) the law “regulates a
racial subject matter . . . to the detriment of the racial minority” and (2) burdens the
ability of minority groups to advocate for meaningful legislation in a way that does not
burden majority voters. D’Alessio, supra note 22, at 111-12 (quoting Amar & Caminker,
supra note 22, at 1029); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982).
212 See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
920 (1995); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause . . . is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the
basis of race.”).
213 See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 30-34 (2004).
214 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1653; see also Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert,
A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1993); Henry L. Chambers, Jr.,
Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1399 (2002).
215 See, e.g., Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (finding gerrymandering
claims were nonjusticiable because they did not implicate equal protection race
discrimination claims); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (striking down literacy
tests as a voting requirement).
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situated groups differently under the law.216 When disparate
treatment of similarly situated groups results from government
classifications, courts review an equal protection challenge under
one of three levels of judicial scrutiny.217 If a fundamental right is
not implicated and the discriminatory classifications do not affect
a suspect or quasi-suspect class, judges review the challenged
action under a rational basis standard.218 Traditionally, judges
give great deference to the legislature under rational basis
review.219 The challenger has the burden to show that the
legislative classification at issue does not have “a rational
relationship . . . [to] some legitimate governmental purpose.”220
Further, the equal protection prong of the political
process doctrine does not easily apply by analogy to the LGBT
community. The substantive due process rationale employed by
the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges did not change the fact that,
to date, the Supreme Court has refrained from characterizing
sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal
protection purposes.221
Although the Supreme Court has denied explicitly
applying heightened scrutiny to classifications that discriminate
216 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause is applicable to the federal
government by “reverse incorporation” through the Fifth Amendment).
217 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(summarizing the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence); City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (explaining the “continuum of judgmental
responses to differing classifications which have been explained in opinions by terms
ranging from ‘strict scrutiny’ at one extreme to ‘rational basis’ at the other” (citing San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing “the Court’s rigidified approach to equal protection analysis”))).
218 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979);
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
219 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (“[T]hose
challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts
on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be
true by the governmental decisionmaker.” (quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 111)).
220 Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (citing
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
221 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202-03 n.2 (1986) (“[U]nder the circumstances of this case, a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause may well be available without having to reach
the more controversial question whether homosexuals are a suspect class.”), overruled
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, is not correct today, and is hereby overruled. This case does not involve
minors, persons who might be injured or coerced, those who might not easily refuse
consent, or public conduct or prostitution. It does involve two adults who, with full and
mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.
Petitioners’ right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in private conduct without government intervention.”).
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on the basis of sexual orientation,222 its opinions suggest
otherwise.223 In Romer v. Evans,224 Lawrence v. Texas,225 and
United States v. Windsor226—all cases challenging government
classifications based on sexual orientation227—the Court applied
“a more searching form of rational basis review.”228 These cases,
which struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment blocking
any government entity from extending nondiscrimination
protections to homosexuals,229 invalidated an antisodomy law,230
and found the definition of marriage as between one man and one
woman unconstitutional under the federal Defense of Marriage
Act,231 have created flux in the lower courts as to whether
homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis.232 Indeed, the Second and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have extended heightened protections to
classifications based on sexual orientation.233
The Supreme Court has defined a suspect class entitled to
heightened scrutiny as one “saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
222 See Patrick McKinley Brennan, “The Pursuit of Happiness” Comes Home to
Roost? Same-Sex Union, the Summum Bonum, and Equality, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 323,
335 (2013) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has never held that sexual orientation is a
suspect classification.”).
223 See M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany Chang, Moving Beyond the “Immutability
Debate” in the Fight for Equality After Proposition 8, 12 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON
MINORITY ISSUES 1, 22 (2009); M. Katherine Baird Darmer, “Immutability” and Stigma:
Towards a More Progressive Equal Protection Rights Discourse, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y&L. 439, 448 (2010); Andrea L. Claus, The Sex Less Scrutinized: The Case for Suspect
Classification for Sexual Orientation, 5 PHX. L. REV. 151, 152 (2011).
224 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado constitutional
amendment which forbid any state actor from applying nondiscrimination protections on
the basis of sexual orientation).
225 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (invalidating an antisodomy law).
226 United States v. Windsor 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the Defense
of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as between one man and one woman).
227 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In striking down an
antisodomy statute, parting from the majority’s analysis under due process, Justice
O’Connor applied an equal protection analysis, stating, “When a law exhibits such a
desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of
rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.
228 Id.; see also Darmer & Chang, supra note 223, at 22 (describing how the Court
departed from its traditional rational basis standard of review and applied “rational basis
with [a] bite”).
229 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
230 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
231 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
232 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 61.
233 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (refusing to adopt the reasoning of the Second Circuit or the
recognition that discrimination based on sexual orientation should be subject to
heightened scrutiny); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 476
(9th Cir. 2014) (applying a Batson-type analysis to preemptory juror challenge based on
sexual orientation).
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relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”234 Generally, the Court has recognized a group as
suspect or quasi-suspect based on four factors: (1) “whether the
class has been historically ‘subjected to discrimination’”;235 (2)
whether members of the group are defined by immutable or
distinguishing characteristics;236 (3) whether the group can be
characterized as a minority or has suffered political
powerlessness;237 and (4) “whether the class has a defining
characteristic that ‘frequently bears [a] relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society.’”238 Of these four factors, the
presence of an immutable characteristic and political
powerlessness considerations are typically most controversial in
analyzing whether the LGBT community constitutes a suspect or
quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.239
“As to immutability, the relevant inquiry is not whether
a person could, in fact, change a characteristic, but rather
whether the characteristic is so integral to a person’s identity
that it would be inappropriate to require her to change it to
avoid discrimination.”240 The most significant consideration in
concluding whether a characteristic is immutable is “whether
th[at] characteristic invites discrimination when it is manifest.”241
Classifications based on gender,242 religion,243 and
illegitimacy244 are entitled to heightened constitutional protections
according to Supreme Court jurisprudence. Like gender, religion,
and illegitimacy, sexual orientation and gender identity are
234 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quoting San Antonio
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
235 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181 (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)).
236 Id. (citing Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602).
237 Id.
238 Id. (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
440-41 (1985)).
239 See, e.g., John Nicodemo, Comment, Homosexuals, Equal Protection, and
the Guarantee of Fundamental Rights in the New Decade: An Optimist’s Quasi-Suspect
View of Recent Events and Their Impact on Heighted Scrutiny for Sexual Orientation-
Based Discrimination, 28 TOURO L. REV. 285 (2012).
240 Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (“[T]hese
characteristics are ‘an integral part of human freedom’ entitled to constitutional protection,
as is sexual expression.” (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003))).
241 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184.
242 Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 239 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
243 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982).
244 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503 (1976); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 765-66 (1977).
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characteristics that are “integral part[s] of human freedom.”245
Also like those classifications, sexual orientation and gender
identity are characteristics that suffer from a documented
history of being the basis for discrimination.246 Based on these
qualities, in addressing the Defense of Marriage Act’s explicit
exclusion of same-sex marriage, the Second Circuit concluded
that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic.247
Additionally, as to political powerlessness, the Circuit
Court in Windsor concluded that, like gender, there is still
“pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination [based
on sexual orientation] . . . in the political arena.”248 The fact that
the LGBT community has achieved some political victories is not
dispositive.249 The relevant inquiry is whether “minorities may be
unable to protect themselves from discrimination at the hands of
the majoritarian political process.”250 Arkansas’s Hester’s Law and
others like it are a testament to the fact that members of the
LGBT community are still politically powerless when it comes to
protecting themselves from discrimination in the political arena.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell recognized a
fundamental right to marry for all couples despite their sexual
orientation.251 But it did not change the status of members of the
LGBT community for purposes of equal protection analysis.252
While Obergefell was a watershed decision furthering the dignity
of same-sex couples’ relationships and families, it left gaping holes
in the legal landscape and did nothing to advance the extension of
245 Love, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
577 (2003)).
246 BADGETT ET AL., supra note 42 (reporting that 15%–43% of gay and
transgender employees suffer some form of discrimination on the job, 8%–17% of gay and
transgender workers report being passed over or fired because of their sexual orientation or
gender identity, 10%–28% received a negative performance review or were passed over for a
promotion because they were gay or transgender, and 7%–41% of gay and transgender
workers were verbally or physically abused or had their workplace vandalized).
247 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012); see also
Weatherby, supra note 39 (arguing that gender identity is an integral part of a
transgender individual’s personhood).
248 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
685-86 (1973)).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
252 Danielle Weatherby et al., The Supreme Court Upholds Same-Sex
Marriage: Expert Reaction—Marriage is a Fundamental Right, CONVERSATION (June
27, 2015, 12:36 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-supreme-court-upholds-same-sex-
marriage-expert-reaction-43961 [http://perma.cc/R829-MWMR] (“The court refrained
from categorizing ‘sexual orientation’ as a suspect class (that is, a class of individuals
who have been discriminated against historically). This means the court bypassed the
dicey equal protection analysis that would have engendered a level of higher judicial
scrutiny in analyzing a law as to whether it has violated the rights of a suspect class.”).
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antidiscrimination protections to LGBT individuals in other
aspects of their lives.253
V. THE POST-ROMER AND POST-SCHUETTE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OFHESTER-TYPE LAWS
Interestingly, while Justice Kennedy provided the swing
vote in both Obergefell and Schuette, he took contrasting positions
on the “political process” analysis in these decisions.254 In
Obergefell, Justice Kennedy focused on the fundamental right of
marriage and the interest in bestowing the dignity of marriage to
all loving couples and families.255 He emphatically asserted that
fundamental rights are not subject to voter approval.256
In contrast, writing for the plurality in Schuette, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion echoed some of the same language as Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent in Obergefell.257 Chief Justice Roberts
framed the issue in Obergefell as who should make the “policy
decision” of extending marriage rights to same-sex couples, not
whether it is a good policy.258 Likewise, Justice Kennedy framed
the issue in Schuette as who decides whether to ban racial
preferences in admissions, not on the permissibility or soundness
of such a policy.259
Justice Kennedy tempered his endorsement of the political
process to decide controversial issues like affirmative action in
admissions by recognizing that the Constitution must protect “the
253 In an ideal and admittedly unrealistic world, were the Court to apply the
political process doctrine to Hester-type laws, it would have to recognize that these laws are
born out of animus to an unpopular group and apply rational basis “plus,” as it did in Romer
v. Evans. Notably, by applying the political process doctrine to LGBT rights, the Court
would be able to further the progress made in Windsor without advancing the level of
judicial suspicion of LGBT individuals as a class, since creating new suspect and quasi-
suspect classes seems something the Court is reluctant to do. This application of the
doctrine would result in a “best of both worlds” solution in which the rights of LGBT
individuals outside the right to marry are protected, while allowing the Court to refrain
from extending its jurisprudence beyond that which it is comfortable doing.
254 Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (majority opinion), with Schuette v.
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for
Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (plurality opinion).
255 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594-2611.
256 Id. at 2606 (“[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections.” (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 638 (1943))).
257 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629-39.
258 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
259 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638. The Court concluded that “[d]eliberative
debate on sensitive issues such as racial preferences all too often may shade into
rancor. But that does not justify removing certain court-determined issues from the
voters’ reach. Democracy does not presume that some subjects are either too divisive or
too profound for public debate.” Id.
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right of the individual not to be injured by the unlawful exercise
of governmental power.”260 Presumably, Justice Kennedy’s two
opinions can be reconciled by his recognition of same-sex
marriage as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution
and race-based preferences as a “difficult and delicate” policy
issue not constitutionally required.261
There is agreement, however, in Justice Kennedy’s
Schuette plurality opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting
opinion in Obergefell. As Justice Kennedy said about Michigan’s
constitutional ban on race-based preferences, when a “difficult
question of public policy” is at issue, the voters have the right to
decide the question “through a lawful electoral process.”262 This
is, in fact, the exact lens through which Chief Justice Roberts
opined that the same-sex marriage bans at issue in Obergefell
were constitutional.263 The core of the Justices’ differing opinions
in Obergefell focused on whether same-sex marriage was an
issue of public policy or an individual fundamental right that
demands protection under the Constitution, even when a
majority of voters disapprove.264
Ultimately, the constitutionality of legislative acts or voter
initiatives that prevent local governments from extending
nondiscrimination ordinances to members of the LGBT community
may turn on whether these laws implicate public policy or are
“inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class [they]
affect[].”265 Thus, if the Colorado Romer amendment and the
Michigan Schuette amendment represent a continuum between
unconstitutional and constitutional, where a Hester-type law falls
between these two precedents is critical to the analysis.
A Hester-type law might be considered the “anti”
antidiscrimination law. These laws block local efforts to extend
antidiscrimination protections to groups that are not already
260 Id. at 1636.
261 Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“The right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may
not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”), with Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636.
262 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1626, 1637.
263 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia J., dissenting).
264 See generally id. If the Court deems a right as not fundamental, then rational
basis review applies. In that circumstance, the ballot box, rather than the courts, are the
recourse for change. Absent a fundamental right, the issue is one of policy rather than a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. See id. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(citing LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 42 (1958)) (referring to Justice Holmes’s
dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905), and criticizing the majority’s
analysis of same sex marriage under substantive due process as “elevat[ing] their own
policy judgments to the status of constitutionally protected ‘liberty’”).
265 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
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protected by state law. As in Arkansas, the majority of state
laws do not prohibit LGBT status-based discrimination in public
accommodations, housing, or employment.266 Therefore, a
Hester-type law invalidates and preempts any local efforts to
pass nondiscrimination ordinances covering members of the
LGBT community.267
Supporters of “anti” antidiscrimination laws, like
Hester’s Law, argue that the Constitution does not, and should
not, require heightened equal protection status for members of
the LGBT community.268 Therefore, extending the umbrella of
nondiscrimination laws to LGBT individuals is a matter of
policy and, like Schuette, should be left to the voters or their
elected representatives. Contrary to this position, blocking a
minority group from a political process that is open to the
majority, making it more difficult for the minority to effectuate
266 See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, #32REASONS: STATES THAT LACK FULLY
INCLUSIVE NON-DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS, http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-
1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/31reasons-comprehensive.pdf [http://perma.cc/
NZ4T-5CMH] (last visited May 10, 2016) (showing that only 18 of the 50 states have
laws prohibiting discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity
in housing and employment, meaning that an individual could get married to her
same-sex spouse on one day and be fired from her job the very next day because of her
sexual orientation).
267 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1-401 to -403 (West 2015).
268 See, e.g., Dave Price, THE INSIDERS: Iowa Congressman Steve King, WHO
TV (Mar. 3, 2014, 10:53 AM), http://whotv.com/2014/03/02/the-insiders-iowa-congressman-
steve-king/ [http://perma.cc/9KPY-ZAUX] (commenting on Arizona Governor Brewer’s
decision to veto S.B. 1062, which would have otherwise allowed businesses to deny services
to persons based on the business owners’ religious beliefs, U.S. Representative Steve King
stated in a video interview, “There’s nothing mentioned in [civil rights law] on self-professed
behavior, and that is what [Brewer and other opponents of S.B. 1062] are trying to protect—
[it] is special rights for [LGBTs’] self-professed behavior”); David Badash, ‘Singled Out’ GOP
Lawmaker to End All LGBT Protections ‘Because I Am Married to One Woman,’ NEW CIV.
RTS. MOVEMENT (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/
davidbadash/_singled_out_gop_lawmaker_to_end_all_lgbt_protections_because_i_am_marri
ed_to_one_woman [http://perma.cc/7DKA-FZEM] (addressing the issue of S.B.202,
Arkansas State Senator Bart Hester commented that the bill was about standardizing civil
rights across the State of Arkansas and that “I want everyone in the LGBT community to
have the same rights I do. I do not want them to have special rights that I do not have”);
Justin Lloyd, Conservative Leader Sees Bigger Picture of Senate Bill 202, ARK. TRAVELER
(Feb. 25, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.uatrav.com/the_companion/article_e76b7f52-bbbb-
11e4-b962-4fd43df4276f.html [http://perma.cc/8GDP-F6B9] (quoting Representative Charlie
Collins, a supporter of S.B. 202, as stating that “the bill will stop current [cities] from
passing laws from protecting new classes already created at the state or federal level”);
Bryan Lowry, Gov. Sam Brownback Rescinds Protected-Class Status for LGBT State
Workers in Kansas, KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 10, 2015, 3:55 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/
news/government-politics/article9694028.html [http://perma.cc/JA4F-SE8T] (explaining his
decision to issue an executive order that rescinded previous protections afforded to LGBT
state workers, Kansas Gov. Sam Brownback stated that the “Executive Order ensures that
state employees enjoy the same civil rights as all Kansans without creating additional
‘protected classes’ as the previous [now-rescinded] order did”).
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positive legislation, is not a matter of policy; it is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.
The future vitality of the political process doctrine is
uncertain after Schuette. Nevertheless, the type of injury the
political process doctrine was meant to remedy is exactly the type
of harm caused by statewide initiatives that block local efforts to
expand nondiscrimination protection to the LGBT community.
Changing the political process “in the middle of the game”269 in a
way that makes minority participation more burdensome may
ameliorate the majority’s concern about its role in controversial
policy matters. But it creates unintended equal protection
consequences.270 Certainly, the right to participate equally in the
political process should not be subject to voter approval. For this
reason, Hester-type laws would be presumptively unconstitutional
under the political process doctrine.
The theory of the political process doctrine is not dead,
even if the doctrine itself is on life support.271 In our
representative democracy, equal access to the political process is a
right guaranteed by the Constitution,272 not a policy, and it should
not be conferred or circumvented by majoritarian rule.
The LGBT community has had its greatest political
successes in obtaining LGBT-friendly legislation at the local level,
where government decisionmakers are closest and most
accountable to the voters. Local communities vary in how they
value LGBT-protective laws. As Justice Scalia pointed out in
his Romer dissent, “geographic concentration” of LGBT folks
and sympathizers in a particular community may give
“disproportionate political power” to LGBT-friendly voters.273
Although Justice Scalia suggested that this is a negative result of
local living patterns that the majority can counter, local power to
affect local law is and always has been a very effective political
process. Banning local efforts to achieve beneficial legislation
imposes a “higher plane” of the political process274 upon LGBT
269 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1653
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
270 By changing the political process for LGBT individuals, these laws are
essentially gaming the political process by allowing the majority to pursue their
discriminatory interests and depriving LGBT individuals of equal protection under
local laws, an arena where LGBT individuals might have a better chance of success in
passing such laws.
271 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1653-54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
272 Id.
273 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
274 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1662 n.7 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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members—and only LGBT members—to achieve favorable
antidiscrimination laws.275
Proponents of Hester’s Law assert that the law does not
single out members of the LGBT community because the law
equally affects other groups not already protected under state
antidiscrimination laws. 276 But it is undeniable that Hester-type
laws came either in anticipation of or as a reaction to the Court’s
historic marriage equality decision and other attempts to expand
legal protections for the LGBT community.277 While the sponsors
of Hester-type laws may be more subtle in their drafting than
those who drafted Amendment 2 in Colorado,278 the suspicious
275 Without heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis as applied to
suspect and quasi-suspect classes, members of the LGBT community have no positive
right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be exempt from discrimination by state law.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). In striking down West Virginia’s
law prohibiting black men from serving on grand and petit juries, the Court reasoned
that while the language of the Fourteenth Amendment is prohibitory, by implication,
there is a positive right to be exempt from legal discrimination. Id.
276 See, e.g., Dominic Holden, Arkansas Legislature Expected to Pass Law
Allowing LGBT Discrimination, BUZZFEED (Feb. 11, 2015, 9:17 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/dominicholden/arkansas-legislature-expected-to-pass-law-allow
ing-lgbt-disc#.jiygAyq89 [http://perma.cc/R7TW-9GT8] (commenting on concerns that S.B.
202 might be used to target LGBT individuals, Arkansas State Senator Bart Hester
disagreed and stated that S.B. 202 treats everyone equally and that everyone may be
singled out for discrimination in one way or another—that “[he is] singled out as a
politician . . . [and] singled out because [he is] married to one woman”).
277 See Alex Reed, Pro-Business or Anti-Gay? Disguising LGBT Animus as
Economic Legislation, 9 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & C.L. 153, 187-212 (2013) (arguing that (1)
the historical background against which similar bills enacted in Tennessee and proposed
in Montana, Nebraska, Michigan, and Oklahoma, along with (2) the specific sequence of
events leading up to the debate, introduction, or enactment of such bills, indicate that the
advancement of such laws by the respective legislative bodies was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose); Arkansas Tea Party, Rally for True Marriage Senator Bart
Hester, YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJGh5H3QxlI
[http://perma.cc/4TMK-7A79] (speaking at the Rally for True Marriage, an event to rally
against Judge Piazza’s ruling on the same-sex marriage ban in Wright v. Arkansas, State
Senator Bart Hester expressed his personal disapproval towards gay marriage—stating
that the bible states clearly that “marriage is between one man and one woman” and that
“[e]vil does not become good, wrong does not become right, and lies do not become trust,
just because a few accept it. And we all know what truth is”); John Lyon, Updated: House
OKs Bills on Anti-Discrimination Ordinances, ‘Conscience Protection,’ ARK. NEWS (Feb.
15, 2015, 11:02 AM), http://arkansasnews.com/news/arkansas/updated-house-oks-bills-
anti-discrimination-ordinances-conscience-protection [http://perma.cc/76N5-ZD2A] (stating
that in presenting S.B. 202 on the Senate floor, Representative Bob Ballinger asserted
that the bill “would prevent ordinances like one the Fayetteville City Council approved in
August that included prohibitions against discrimination based on sexual orientation or
gender identity in housing, employment and public services”); John Lyon, Updated: Bill
Barring Discrimination Ordinances at City, County Level Becomes Law, ARK. NEWS
(Feb. 24, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://arkansasnews.com/news/arkansas/updated-bill-barring-
discrimination-ordinances-city-county-level-becomes-law [http://perma.cc/JLJ9-TK55]
(stating that the sponsors of S.B. 202 have said that the bill was in reaction to
Fayetteville’s Chapter 119).
278 See, e.g., Guo, supra note 1 (explaining how S.B. 202 tried to “wriggle around
[Romer v. Evans]” by “carefully avoid[ing] mentioning gay people at all”); Press Release,
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timing of the law and the sponsors’ express articulation of
disapproval of LGBT-protective legal efforts suggest that Hester’s
Law and others like it directly target LGBT individuals, just as
Colorado’s Amendment 2 did.279
Despite the spot-on doctrinal fit, the political process
doctrine is judicially unavailable to halt majoritarian laws that
encroach on the LGBT community’s equal right to participate in
the political decisionmaking process. As such, this article proposes
a different analytical framework to achieve the same end.
VI. RETHINKING THEDORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AS
APPLIED TO LEGISLATIVE BARRIERS TO LGBT-
PROTECTIVENDOS
A. The Civil Rights Cases and Heart of Atlanta
One palpable backlash to the Obergefell decision is the
movement to legitimize, based on religious beliefs, discrimination
against LGBT members in public accommodations and other
public arenas.280 Hester-type laws make this discrimination
easier by ensuring that local communities do not pass NDOs
protecting individuals based on sexual orientation and gender
identity, thus perpetuating the separate and unequal treatment
of LGBT individuals.
One solution to counteract this backlash to the nationwide
legalization of same-sex marriage is for Congress to amend Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin” in public
accommodations, by adding protections based on sexual
orientation.281 But given the Republican majority in Congress and
the fact that Congress has previously rejected similar LGBT-
friendly proposals, this is unlikely to happen.282
Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, Leading Civil Rights Legal Organizations Denounce Anti-
LGBT Arkansas Bill, Call on Governor to Veto (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.nclrights.org/
press-room/press-release/leading-civil-rights-legal-organizations-denounce-anti-lgbt-
arkansas-bill-call-on-governor-to-veto/ [http://perma.cc/68AK-MBRM] (stating that the
“sponsors of SB 202 have used sweeping language . . . [in] a transparent attempt to hide
from the courts the blatantly discriminatory reason why [S.B. 202] was adopted” and get
around Romer v. Evans).
279 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (“Amendment 2 . . . prohibits all
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or
gays and lesbians.”).
280 See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
281 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012).
282 See supra Section I.C.
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Well over a century ago, the Supreme Court considered
Congress’s power to prohibit private discrimination.283 After the
Civil War and the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments,
Congress enacted several civil rights laws to give “teeth” to the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.284 The Civil Rights Act
of 1875 prohibited race discrimination by private businesses.285 In
the Civil Rights Cases, a consolidation of several cases brought by
African-American citizens who were excluded from public
accommodations, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
1875 Act.286 The Court limited the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment to state action only and held that Congress had no
“direct and primary” authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to punish race discrimination by private actors.287 The
question of whether Congress could exercise this authority under
its Commerce Clause powers was raised but not answered.288
The Court answered that question 70 years later.289 In
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Court upheld Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.290 The Court distinguished the
Civil Rights Cases, which invalidated the 1875 Act, from Title II
of the 1964 Act.291 In the 1964 Act, Congress limited the reach of
Title II to specific categories of public accommodations.292 One of
the categories defined as public accommodations included
establishments with “operations [that] affect commerce.”293 Thus,
private discrimination in public accommodations could be
prohibited under Congress’s broad Commerce Clause powers.294
The distinction between these two Acts is the authority
Congress invoked to justify its prohibition of private
discrimination.295 In Heart of Atlanta, the Court opened the door
for Congress to regulate private discrimination under its
Commerce Clause powers, in juxtaposition to the 1875 Act,
which the Court struck down, concluding that Congress had no
283 See generally United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. (13
Otto) 3 (1883).
284 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335-37.
285 See id.
286 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4.
287 Id. at 20.
288 Id. at 60 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
289 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
290 Id. at 245-46.
291 Id. at 250-53.
292 Id. at 247.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 276-77.
295 Id. at 245-62.
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power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit
private discrimination.296
Today, it is well settled that private discrimination in
public accommodations substantially affects both intrastate and
interstate commerce.297 In fact, the formal titles of Hester’s Law
and other similar state laws include language suggestive of their
direct ties to commerce. For example, these laws include phrases
like “Intrastate Commerce Act” as part of their formal titles.298
Although banning local efforts to pass LGBT-inclusive
NDOs is not an affirmative act condoning or requiring
discrimination, it is government acquiescence to such
discrimination. These laws are “veiled” attempts to discriminate
against members of the LGBT community. While it certainly
could be argued, as it was in Romer v. Evans, that Hester-type
laws simply prohibit special treatment for the LGBT community,
the Romer Court rejected that argument.299 Therefore, if and
when these laws are challenged, the “no special treatment”
argument should hold no force.
To be clear, Hester-type laws do not go as far as Colorado’s
Amendment 2, but despite more subtle drafting, these laws have
the same effect: they block local efforts to pass LGBT-friendly
NDOs and make it more difficult for the LGBT community to
achieve beneficial legislation. Indeed, the LGBT community—and
only that community—must appeal to the state legislature or
statewide electorate to repeal local bans on or achieve state
antidiscrimination protections.
In a constitutional challenge to these Hester-type laws,
the political process doctrine is of no avail. Heightened scrutiny
under equal protection is dependent on the composition of the
Supreme Court and its willingness to either extend quasi-suspect
class status to LGBT members or to apply the Romer “rational
basis with [a] bite” scrutiny to these laws.300 This article suggests,
296 Id. at 249, 260-62.
297 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277-
80 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
298 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1-401 to -403 (West 2015); S.B. 202, 90th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (describing its purpose as “to amend the law
concerning ordinances of cities and counties by creating the intrastate commerce
improvement act and to declare an emergency”); Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce
Act, TENN. CODE ANN. 4-21 § 1 (2011).
299 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-36 (1996).
300 Darmer & Chang, supra note 223, at 21. In light of Justice Scalia’s sudden
death and the now empty seat on the Supreme Court, the fate of cases addressing LGBT-
friendly legislation is currently unclear. See Richard Wolf, Here’s How Scalia’s Death Affects
Supreme Court Rulings, USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2016, 7:16 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/
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based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, a novel theory that
overcomes the hurdles faced by other methods challenging these
Hester-type laws.
B. A Dormant Commerce Clause View of De Facto
Discrimination in Public Accommodations Against
Members of the LGBT Community
Before venturing into uncharted territory and proposing a
creative application of the Dormant Commerce Clause, a brief
primer on the Commerce Clause and its negative implications is
warranted. While the Commerce Clause, particularly its dormant
aspect, is a difficult subject to distill in a few paragraphs, the
following is meant to provide a very broad framework.
Enumerated in the Constitution, Congress has broad
authority to regulate commerce.301 Indeed, the Constitution was
drafted, in part, to create a stronger central government,
particularly as applied to the regulation of commerce.302 The
federal government had little power under the Articles of
Confederation.303 As a result, states created trade barriers among
themselves, hindering the growth of a strong national economy.304
The Constitution remedied what the Federalists referred to as
local protectionist factions.305
Historically, the Court has interpreted the scope of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause in various ways,
from very narrow to rather expansive.306 Today, Congress enjoys
story/news/politics/2016/02/14/scalia-death-supreme-court-abortion-immigration-race-labor-
voting-conservative/80372440/ [http://perma.cc/LP6P-YFKU].
301 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
302 See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82
TUL. L. REV. 509 (2007); Vasan Kesavan, When Did the Articles of Confederation Cease
to Be Law?, 78 NOTREDAME L. REV. 35 (2002).
303 See Roderick E. Walston, The Federal Commerce and Navigation Powers:
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County’s Undecided Constitutional Issue, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 706 (2002) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557
(1995)); Marianne Moody Jennings & Nim Razook, United States v. Morrison: Where
the Commerce Clause Meets Civil Rights and Reasonable Minds Part Ways: A Point and
Counterpoint from a Constitutional and Social Perspective, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 23, 24
(2000) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000)).
304 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (discussing the Articles of Confederation and the lack of centralized power
to regulate commerce that resulted in “conflict of commercial [state] regulations,
destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their commercial interests
abroad”); Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SANDIEGO L. REV. 249 (1997).
305 Smith, supra note 304; see also Stephen M. Feldman, Is the Constitution Laissez-
Faire?: The Framers, OriginalMeaning, and theMarket, 81 BROOK. L.REV. 1, 8 (2015).
306 See generally Stephen Ganter, Did United States v. Lopez Turn Back the
Clock on the Commerce Clause?, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 343, 349-53 (1996) (discussing
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broad power to regulate commerce covering three categories of
activity.307 These categories include (1) the “channels of interstate
commerce,” (2) “instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and (3)
“activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”308 The
Court has defined the instrumentalities that Congress may
“regulate and protect” as “persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities.”309
Despite the fact that Congress enjoys extensive power to
regulate commerce, this power is not exclusive.310 Early
Commerce Clause cases held that the Tenth Amendment
supported states’ rights to regulate intrastate commerce, as
well.311 States had this power even if “the products of a domestic
manufacture may ultimately become the subjects of interstate
commerce.”312 But reeling from the Great Depression of the late
1930s, the Court acquiesced to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
pressure to uphold his New Deal legislation.313 This ushered in an
era of shifting state and federal power, granting Congress broad
authority to regulate commerce—even intrastate commerce—when
it substantially affects interstate commerce.314 Since this shift, a
patchwork of federal cases have addressed questions regarding the
scope of the states’ remaining power to regulate commerce.315
the New Deal, “Switch in Time,” and subsequent judicial decisions and how these
impacted the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
307 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
308 Id.
309 Id. at 558.
310 Id. at 584-85.
311 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 293-94 (1936).
312 Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1888). But see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“[T]he power of Congress [to regulate commerce] does not
stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States.”).
313 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)
(“Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.”).
314 Id. at 36-38.
315 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (finding that a state medical
marijuana law was preempted by the federal Controlled Substance Act because Congress
created a broad regulatory scheme to combat illegal drugs under its Commerce Clause
powers); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (invalidating
the federal gun-free school zone law because any connection to interstate commerce was
loosely made based on stacking inferences; the Court said that Congress exceeded its
Commerce Clause powers by regulating guns in general, rather than providing a
“jurisdictional hook” to interstate commerce by limiting the reach of the statute to guns
moving through interstate commerce); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,
452 U.S. 264 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding wheat
production quota law even though the wheat was grown intrastate for noncommercial,
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One category of cases in which the Court has attempted to
delineate state and federal authority to regulate commerce
involves questions of federal preemption.316 Of course, under the
Supremacy Clause, existing federal regulation precludes state
regulation.317 Where a federal and state regulation conflict, the
federal government’s authority to regulate in the area forecloses
the state’s power to regulate the subject matter.318 As applied to
Hester-type laws, since Congress has not yet extended Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation or gender identity, there is no federal law that
would conflict with a state law banning local efforts to enact
LGBT-protective ordinances.319 Therefore, these state laws face no
federal preemption challenges under the Supremacy Clause.
Other cases involve the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause.320 In these cases, there is no direct conflict
between federal and state regulations.321 Typically, these cases
involve confusion over whether Congress has regulated in the
entire subject area or even in part of the subject area, leaving
open unregulated areas for the states to regulate.322 Then, the
inquiry focuses on (1) whether Congress has exclusive power,
precluding states to regulate in the area, even in the absence of
federal regulation, (2) whether states have concurrent jurisdiction
to regulate in an area, and if so, (3) what limits should apply to
the state’s power.323 Finally, in determining the limits of a state’s
power to regulate commerce in an area where there is concurrent
jurisdiction, the Court can invoke the Dormant Commerce Clause
in determining whether a state regulation discriminates against
or directly regulates interstate commerce.324 The level of deference
personal use, creating a broad notion of Commerce Clause powers based on an aggregate
theory that even in-state, noncommercial activity could in the aggregate affect interstate
commerce).
316 See, e.g., Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S.
493 (1989).
317 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
318 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819)) (stating that “state law that conflicts with
federal law is ‘without effect’” (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981))).
319 See supra Section I.C.
320 See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n, v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80
(1995) (explaining the negative implications of the Commerce Clause).
321 Id.
322 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1963).
323 Id. at 142.
324 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (stating that where a state or local
regulation “discriminate[s] against interstate commerce ‘either on its face or in practical
effect,’” the Court applies strict scrutiny and the regulation will be held unconstitutional
unless there are no less restrictive means to meet a “legitimate local purpose”; on the other
hand, where the regulation serves a legitimate local concern and has only an incidental
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the Court will give to the state’s regulation depends on the extent
to which the regulation burdens interstate commerce.325
Most law students’ eyes glaze over when the Dormant
Commerce Clause is introduced in their first-year Constitutional
Law class. The dormancy described, however, is the nebulous
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause.326 Particularly unpopular
with some of the Justices, the various cases applying the Dormant
Commerce Clause seem irreconcilable. Even the Justices struggle
with the Dormant Commerce Clause and the body of case law
that has interpreted and applied the doctrine.327 Justice Thomas
expressed his view that “‘[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no
basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has
proved virtually unworkable in application[,]’ and, consequently,
cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state statute.”328
Despite its complexity, the Dormant Commerce Clause
(or the negative implications of the Commerce Clause) completes
the circle of Congress’s broad authority over interstate
commerce.329 It ensures that the states’ interest in maximizing
their own economies will not create barriers, something that was
an unfixable problem under the Articles of Confederation.330 It
effect on interstate commerce, the Court will find such regulations unconstitutional “only if
the burdens they impose on interstate trade are ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits’” (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979))); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
325 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (applying a balancing test to determine whether
the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the local burden).
326 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
327 See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Court’s unjustified, nontextual application of it,
which the Court has done very poorly for over a century). According to Justice Scalia,
“There is no conceivable reason why congressional inaction under the Commerce
Clause should be deemed to have the same preemptive effect elsewhere accorded only
to congressional action. There, as elsewhere, ‘Congress’ silence is just that—
silence . . . .” Id. (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987)).
328 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68
(2003)); see also Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
329 See Anna J. Cramer, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: An
Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REV. 271, 275
(2000); Larry E. Gee, Federalism Revisited: The Supreme Court Resurrects the Notion of
Enumerated Powers by Limiting Congress’s Attempt to Federalize Crime, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J.
151, 157-59 (1995) (providing a history of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence);
Maxwell L. Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical Perspective,
60 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007).
330 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1184 (1986).
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also helps fulfill the promise of the Constitution and ensures
national unity.331
Although an imperfect fit, the Dormant Commerce Clause
might be an effective doctrine to challenge the constitutionality of
laws banning local NDOs that protect LGBT members. Recently,
big businesses such as Walmart, Target, and Apple have
threatened to boycott states adopting robust religious freedom
laws that would shield businesses from public accommodation
laws if they withheld goods or services from same-sex couples.332
Other mega-corporations like American Airlines, Facebook, Nike,
General Mills, Google, The Dow Chemical Company, and Levi
Strauss have expressed their support for the proposed Equality
Act of 2015.333 These corporate endorsements for LGBT equality
331 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997); C&A Carbone,
Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 411 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that
local favoritism and economic protectionism is what “dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence seeks to root out”). But see United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Co., 550 U.S. 330, 343 (2007) (“The dormant Commerce Clause is
not a roving license for federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state
and local government to undertake, and what activities must be the province of private
market competition.”).
332 See Claire Zillman, Salesforce Boycotts Indiana over Fear of LGBT
Discrimination, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2015, 4:51 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/26/
salesforce-indiana-same-sex-law/ [http://perma.cc/8CQF-PNM6] (following the signing into
law of Indiana’s religious freedom bill on March 25, 2015, Salesforce’s founder and CEO
Marc Benioff announced the company’s decision to boycott the State of Indiana and cancel
all programs requiring employees and customers to travel to Indiana); Tim Evans, Angie’s
List Canceling Eastside Expansion over RFRA, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015, 11:38 AM),
http://www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/03/28/angies-list-canceling-eastside-expansion-
rfra/70590738/ [http://perma.cc/52YV-UZAY] (Angie’s List CEO Bill Oesterle announced on
March 28, 2015, the company’s decision to cancel a $40 million headquarters expansion in
Indiana); Jeremy Stoppelman, An Open Letter to States Considering Imposing
Discrimination Laws, YELP (Mar. 26, 2015, 5:52 PM), http://officialblog.yelp.com/2015/03/an-
open-letter-to-states-considering-imposing-discrimination-laws.html [http://perma.cc/DF4J-
JLJM] (Yelp CEO Jeremey Stoppelman threatened to boycott states that enact laws
allowing discrimination against LGBT persons); see also Kay Steiger, The Growing
Backlash Against Indiana’s New LGBT Discrimination Law, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 27,
2015, 10:41 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/03/27/3639895/8-entities-may-boycott-
indiana-new-lgbt-discrimination-bill/ [http://perma.cc/ZL8D-AK9T] (enumerating a list of
artists and entities taking reactive boycotting measures against Indiana); Statement from
Gov. Jay Inslee on Indiana’s new “Religious Freedom” Law, GOVERNOR JAY INSLEE
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/statement-gov-jay-inslee-ind
iana%E2%80%99s-new-%E2%80%9Creligious-freedom%E2%80%9D-law [http://perma.cc/
S4MM-9TJD] (Washington Governor Jay Inslee announced on March 30, 2015, an
administration-wide ban on state-funded travel to Indiana); Danielle Weatherby, Corporate
America Just Became the LGBT Community’s Most Powerful Ally, FORTUNE (Apr. 2, 2016,
11:00 AM), http://fortune.com/author/danielle-weatherby/ [http://perma.cc/6SP4-SK7T].
333 Tom Huddleston, Jr., Google Joins Chorus of Companies Backing LGBT
Bill, FORTUNE (July 28, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/28/google-equality-
act-lgbt/ [http://perma.cc/C77N-W4YY]. Of course, there are always businesses that will
take the opposite, more conservative stance on social issues, and there may be
incentives to avoid more liberal states. Certainly, Hobby Lobby has become infamous
for its strong anti-abortion position. The flight of these businesses could also have a
negative effect on interstate commerce. But as the general consumer becomes more
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evidence the effect that laws aimed at preempting LGBT civil
rights, though applicable to intrastate commerce only, would in
the aggregate have on interstate commerce.334
As states like Arkansas, Michigan, Texas, West Virginia,
and Tennessee try to mitigate or circumvent the legal
consequences of Obergefell by passing Hester-type laws, the
Dormant Commerce Clause might be a viable weapon to
invalidate these laws. The Dormant Commerce Clause applies to
state laws that have the effect of economic protectionism or
economic isolation.335 Regulations have the effect of economic
protectionism if they are “designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”336 Economic
isolation occurs when a state tries “to isolate itself from a problem
common to [many] states by raising barriers to the free flow of
interstate [commerce].”337
Contrary to the usual effect of regulations creating
economic protectionism, states with Hester-type laws may suffer
economic losses as people and businesses flee a state that they
believe engages in LGBT discrimination.338 For states like
Arkansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia, and
socially liberal, the trend is for companies to either take progressive views on social
issues or to remain silent. See, e.g., Phil Wahba, Corporate America Comes Out
Swinging Against ‘Religious Freedom’ Laws, FORTUNE (Mar. 31, 2015, 1:26 PM),
http://fortune.com/2015/03/31/corporate-america-religious-freedom/ [http://perma.cc/L3VR-
495Q]; Sandhya Somashekhar, After Epic 39-Hour Filibuster, Missouri Senate Passes
Bill Criticized as Anti-gay, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2016/03/09/after-epic-39-hour-filibuster-missouri-senate-passes-bill-
criticized-as-anti-gay/ [http://perma.cc/N6Y9-CLG2] (explaining how Missouri’s
legislature passed a historic “license to discriminate bill” after a record filibuster); Katy
Steinmetz, South Dakota Could Pass ‘Bathroom Bill’ Affecting Transgender Students, TIME
(Feb. 16, 2016, 7:02 PM), http://time.com/4220345/south-dakota-bathroom-bill-religious-
freedom/ [http://perma.cc/RH7T-5UPH] (explaining how South Dakota could be the next
state to pass a “license to discriminate bill” that would allow public schools to ban
transgender students from the restroom that corresponds with their gender identity).
334 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29, 133 (1942) (articulating an
aggregate theory that extends Congress’s Commerce Clause power to regulate totally
intrastate, noncommercial activity).
335 C&A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting); Or. Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Jones v. Memphis, 868
F. Supp. 2d 710, 728 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (“The Commerce Clause is intended to prevent
economic protectionism and insure the free movement of goods between state borders,
prohibiting ‘laws that would excite . . . jealousies and retaliatory measures’ among the
several states.” (quoting Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren, Cty., Ky., 214 F.3d 707,
710-11 (6th Cir. 2000))).
336 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988) (explaining the
“negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause).
337 Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1992); Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995); see also Wardair Canada,
Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 12 (1986); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
338-39 (1979).
338 See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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Texas that may wish to isolate themselves from the effects of the
Obergefell decision, efforts to push LGBT individuals and
businesses to other states threaten to result in economic
isolationism. What is clear is that a state’s economic interests will
undoubtedly fluctuate based on its LGBT-friendly or LGBT-
hostile laws.339
The Court has long held that a state may not insulate
itself from a problem common to all the states.340 In Edwards v.
California, the Court invalidated a statute that made it a
misdemeanor for any person or corporation to knowingly “bring[]
or assist[] in bringing into the State any indigent person who is
not a resident of the State.”341 Knowing that his brother-in-law
was without a job or money, Fred Edwards helped him move to
California from Texas.342 Edwards was convicted of violating the
statute and received a suspended sentence of six months in jail.343
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
California statute was “an unconstitutional barrier to interstate
commerce.”344 Recognizing that the migration of indigent persons
is a financial problem for the State of California, the Court
determined that even the state’s police power could not justify
California’s attempt to “isolate itself from difficulties common to
all [the states] by restraining the transportation of persons and
property across its borders.”345
Any comparison of LGBT individuals to indigent persons
is totally unintended. Further, the authors do not intend to
suggest that LGBT individuals and LGBT-friendly businesses
should be unwelcome in states and their communities—quite the
contrary. Encouraging all kinds of diversity enriches a community
socially, politically, and economically.346 Apparently, however,
Arkansas, West Virginia, Texas, and Tennessee disagree. In
passing Hester-type laws, these states appear to value social
339 Michael Hiltzik, How Indiana’s New Anti-LGBT Law Puts the State and
Businesses in a Bind, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-how-indianas-new-antilgbt-law-20150327-column.html [http://
perma.cc/W5L3-8B36].
340 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 171, 178, 182 (1941) (concurring
opinions thought the California statutes violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, not the Commerce Clause).
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 173.
345 Id.
346 See, e.g., Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCI. AM.
(Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/
[http://perma.cc/9Z8W-W7HG] (analyzing the personal, social, political, and economic
benefits that arise from diversity).
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convention more than diversity. In response to the changing social
landscape, states passing Hester-type laws are attempting to
isolate themselves from the national effect of Obergefell and the
growing trend toward inclusivity.
While Hester-type laws differ substantially from the
California statute invalidated in Edwards, that case supports
the proposition that any laws having an inevitable effect on
interstate migration are matters of national concern and are
thus subject to Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.347 States
cannot regulate in areas affecting interstate commerce that
“demand . . . their regulation . . . be prescribed by a single
authority”—the federal government.348
Admittedly, federal courts may be reluctant to apply the
Dormant Commerce Clause to constitutional challenges to
Hester-type laws. But a robust national economy supported by
the free flow of people and goods in interstate commerce is a
strong rationale for judicial review of Dormant Commerce
Clause claims.349 Referring to the importance of national unity,
Justice Cardozo eloquently stated, “[The Constitution] was
framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity
and salvation are in union and not division.”350
Dormant Commerce Clause cases typically present issues
that have both economic and political implications.351 The
economic aspect focuses on the extent to which the state or local
regulation burdens interstate commerce,352 whereas the political
component focuses on who is burdened by the state’s regulation.353
347 Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174.
348 Id. at 176 (quoting Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S.
346, 351 (1939)).
349 Id.
350 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
351 CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND
RECONSTRUCTION 413 (2d ed. 2001).
352 Jennifer L. Larsen, Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D.
L. REV. 844, 846-47 (2004) (stating that the “promotion of national unity” is a “recurring
rationale supporting judicial review of dormant Commerce Clause cases” and is often
addressed in two contexts: (1) economic protectionism and (2) economic isolationism);
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527 (discussing that the doctrine of economic isolation states that “one
state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation. . . .
Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of destination with
the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products
of another state or the labor of its residents. Restrictions so contrived are an unreasonable
clog upon the mobility of commerce”).
353 See SHANOR, supra note 351, at 413; Larsen, supra note 352, at 849
(stating that where “an out-of-state party burdened by a discriminatory regulation of
another state does not have any political weight to encourage the legislature to change
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If the regulation imposes burdens on outsiders—those not part of
the state’s polity or local electorate—judicial intervention is
warranted. Because outsiders have no effective means to change
unfavorable legislation through the political process, judicial
intervention is the only available remedy.354
In applying these principles to challenge Hester-type
laws, the argument rests on the assumption that these laws
are disguised LGBT-discrimination measures that will have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, as recognized in
Heart of Atlanta Motel.355 With Hester-type laws either already
on the books or currently pending in the southern states of
Arkansas, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Texas, the net impact
could be a general trend of businesses that support LGBT
rights fleeing the south and moving north for a more inclusive
business environment.356
As states pass LGBT-hostile laws that are designed to
insulate those states from the changing social landscape that
recognizes marriages and families beyond the traditional one man
and one woman institution, businesses will undoubtedly respond.357
In the aggregate, these laws will affect interstate commerce to the
detriment of other southern states or local progressive
communities, like Fayetteville and Eureka Springs, that support
LGBT-protective measures.358
It is equally likely that LGBT individuals and families will
move out of the states that block local efforts to expand
the regulation, . . . the Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause to protect [such]
politically powerless interests” (footnote omitted)).
354 Larsen, supra note 352, at 849.
355 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
356 Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987); see
also Despite Nationwide Uproar, Discrimination Bill Becomes Arkansas Law, GOVERNING
(Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/Despite-Nationwide-Uproar-
Arkansas-Blocks-Localities-from-Passing-Anti-Discrimination-Laws.html [http://perma.cc/
9468-E53U] (commenting on the passage of S.B. 202, Rita Sklar, Executive Director of
the ACLU of Arkansas, stated that “this bill . . . will amount to a giant, flashing ‘Gays
Stay Away’ sign” and Rea Carey, Executive Director of the National LGBTQ Task Force
Action Fund, predicted it will “stifle[ ] business by sending a message that Arkansas is
not an inclusive place to visit, reside in, or to do business [in]”); Hiltzik, supra note 339
(illustrating how businesses might pull away from states with anti-LGBT laws through
the example of Arizona: (1) after Arizona voters rejected a 1990 ballot measure seeking to
designate Martin Luther King, Jr. Day as a state holiday, the National Football League
relocated the 1993 Super Bowl, scheduled to be held in Arizona, to California, thereby
costing the state roughly $100 million; and (2) after the passing of a harsh anti-
immigration bill, businesses and nonprofit organizations boycotted Arizona, costing the
state approximately $140 million).
357 See Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. 232.
358 Id.
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antidiscrimination protections for their community.359 Further,
like businesses that wish to avoid states with veiled discrimination
laws such as Hester’s Law, individuals and families seeking an
LGBT-friendly community will avoid these states.360
Under traditional Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
local communities burdened by their state laws would be unable
to bring their claims to court.361 The theory blocking these types of
suits is that disgruntled local communities may utilize the ballot
box to voice their disapproval with their legislators’ enactments.362
But since the precise injury caused by Hester-type laws is the
inability of local communities to participate in the political process
to achieve favorable legislation at a level of decisionmaking
available to every other group, judicial intervention is the only
available remedy to challenge the constitutionality of these anti-
NDO laws. When people and businesses are powerless to effect
legislative changes, the courts should intervene.
The doctrinal fit may not be as seamless as the political
process doctrine, but the Dormant Commerce Clause provides a
framework for federal review of Hester-type laws. Sensible-
minded Americans might be more amenable to recognizing that
the free flow of people and commercial activity in interstate
commerce is more supportive of our national interests than a
“cultural war” about traditional family values.363
CONCLUSION
Almost 20 years ago, Colorado attempted to do on a
larger scale what Hester-type laws aim to do today. While
359 See Frank Newport & Gary J. Gates, San Francisco Metro Area Ranks Highest
in LGBT Percentage, GALLUP (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182051/san-
francisco-metro-area-ranks-highest-lgbt-percentage.aspx [http://perma.cc/EF9A-WT5T]
(finding, in a 2012-214 survey comparing the respective LGBT population of 50
metropolitan areas across various states within the United States, that the top 10 cities
with the highest population of LGBTs were located in “every region of the country except
the Midwest”); Gary J. Gates & Frank Newport, LGBT Percentage Highest in D.C., Lowest
in North Dakota, GALLUP (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160517/lgbt-
percentage-highest-lowest-north-dakota.aspx [http://perma.cc/FLE5-EBFM] (finding that
states with more supportive LGBT legal climates generally have larger LGBT populations—
all states with at least a four percent LGBT population, except South Dakota, have laws
protecting LGBTs from discrimination).
360 Gates & Newport, supra note 359; Newport & Gates, supra note 359.
361 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299-300 (1997).
362 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 343-45 (2007).
363 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Terri Day & Danielle
Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini-RFRA: A Return to Separate but Equal,
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming).
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perhaps more artfully drafted than Colorado’s Amendment 2,
the Hester-type laws in Arkansas, Tennessee, Texas, and West
Virginia, like Colorado’s Amendment 2, are designed to prevent
municipalities from carving out antidiscrimination protections
for LGBT individuals.364
In his scathing dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the
majority of the Romer Court for entering into what he
characterized as a “Kulturkampf.”365 In framing the Coloradans’
efforts to “preserve traditional sexual mores” amidst ever-evolving
social norms, Justice Scalia thought the Court should defer to the
will of the people and honor the political process.366 Even then, the
majority saw through the asserted purpose as pretext and viewed
the Colorado amendment as “inexplicable by anything but
animus” toward homosexuals.367
Despite the recent legal recognition of same-sex marriage,
some states have not evolved past Colorado circa 1996. Indeed,
conservative southern states that oppose LGBT equality have
allowed the statewide electorate to block local efforts to provide
increased LGBT antidiscrimination protections, just like the
Colorado amendment 20 years ago.
Although the Colorado Supreme Court applied the
political process doctrine to Colorado’s Amendment 2, the U.S.
Supreme Court has limited that doctrine’s application to cases
impacting race and access to the ballot box for racial minorities.368
While the injuries caused by Hester-type laws are the precise
injuries that the political process doctrine was designed to protect,
there are limitations on that doctrine. This is particularly so in
light of the Court’s recent marriage equality decision, which did
not go far enough in recognizing sexual orientation as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, further hindering the applicability of the
political process doctrine to this group.
While the Court has recognized the importance of allowing
the voice of the electorate to speak on important and controversial
matters of public policy, there are striking differences between
the majority opinion in Obergefell and the plurality opinion in
Schuette, both authored by Justice Kennedy. The opinions
364 Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
365 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A “kulturkampf” is a “conflict between
civil government and religious authorities especially over control of education and
church appointments; broadly: a conflict between cultures or value systems . . . .”
Kulturkampf, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/Kulturkampf [http://perma.cc/NW4Y-FQGQ] (last visited May 10, 2016).
366 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
367 Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
368 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1982).
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disagree about what issues should be decided by the voters and
when the Constitution should protect a minority group against
the majority. Specifically, in Obergefell, despite the dissent’s view
that it was a policy decision that should be decided by the voters,
Justice Kennedy declared same-sex marriage a fundamental right
not subject to voter approval. In contrast, in Schuette v. BAMN,
Justice Kennedy upheld the political process when Michigan
voters amended their state constitution to ban race-sensitive
admissions preferences. Like Chief Justice Roberts’s Obergefell
dissent, Justice Kennedy felt that affirmative action in
admissions was a difficult and delicate policy decision and should
be left to the will of the people.
How the Court would view Hester-type laws (e.g., the
Colorado amendment in Romer or the Michigan admissions
amendment) is uncertain. But it is likely that the conservative
Justices on the Court would view Hester-type laws as affecting a
matter of public policy, which is rightfully left to a popular vote.
Nonetheless, Hester-type laws harm an unpopular minority by
obstructing local communities from passing pro-LGBT legislation.
It is questionable whether the political process doctrine,
which used to trigger strict scrutiny review when laws change the
political process “in the middle of the game,”369 survives post-
Schuette. Now the Court seems to favor notions of political process
that uphold the electorate’s wishes even at the expense of an
unpopular minority.
Just as the U.S. Constitution sets the floor for liberties
and protections, allowing states to provide greater benefits and
protections to their citizens, state constitutions should similarly
set the floor, not the ceiling, for local laws.370 Hester-type laws are
barriers to progressive communities, where the governed are
closest to the power and are able to effect legal change. States
reacting in fear to the potential ripple effect of Obergefell are
inappropriately using Hester-type laws and the legislative process
to fight cultural change to the status quo.
As an alternative to the framework of the equal protection
and political process doctrines, this article proposes a novel
repurposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause under the
assumption that Hester-type laws will affect interstate commerce.
369 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant
Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1653
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
370 See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (stating that the states have the
power to impose higher standards than those required by the federal Constitution).
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If pro-inclusive individuals and businesses will flee from states
with Hester-type laws and migrate to states with laws supporting
inclusivity,371 Hester-type laws could implicate concerns about
economic isolationism, which in the aggregate could negatively
affect interstate commerce. Hester-type laws allow states
opposing change to isolate themselves from the evolving social
landscape at the expense of minority groups in their communities.
It is not uncommon for a constitutional doctrine to
undergo a metamorphosis. At one time, liberty guaranteed under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected
laissez-faire economics and the right to contract.372 As the country
faced paralysis from an economic depression, the Court
reinterpreted the meaning of liberty.373 Decades later, this same
liberty protected personal rights, rather than contract rights.374
Today, our country stands at the precipice of changing
notions of personal and family relationships.375 Just as the
principles of due process transformed from economics to personal
liberty376 to match the needs of the time, so too should the doctrine
of the Dormant Commerce Clause evolve from protecting equality
in interstate commerce to also protecting equality in public
accommodations for members of the LGBT community.
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